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1 Preface
Since Becker (1973, 1974) first provided a unified approach to studying modern family
economics, more and more research has focused on the interaction of decision-making
within the household. Even if it is reasonable to assume a common set of preferences
within the family, due to the nature of gender differences, many decisions are made
through the interaction of household members rather than by a unitary family. These
decisions relate to areas such as marriage and divorce, the division of household labor, as
well as fertility choices. Therefore, when analyzing the effect of policies and demographic
changes that may affect women and men differently, it is important to take the interaction
of household members into consideration. Consequently, the goal of this dissertation
is to understand which factors may affect intra-household bargaining, how important
intra-household bargaining is, and the corresponding mechanism in answering economic
questions.
This dissertation comprises three self-contained chapters, in which I investigate the
effect of demographic changes and policies on intra-household allocations when the relative
bargaining power is endogenously determined. In Chapter 2, I use a quantitative model
to evaluate the effect of imbalanced sex ratios on female and male welfare in China. The
imbalanced sex ratio affects the marriage market, which changes the relative bargaining
power within the household, and hence individual labor supply and welfare. Chapter 3
further investigates the imbalanced sex ratio problem in China empirically and provides
evidence in support of the arguments in Chapter 2. Chapter 4 studies the effect of a
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counter-factual income tax reform from joint taxation to individual taxation on married
female labor supply, when the relative after-tax income directly affects the relative
bargaining power. The tax reform will lower the marginal tax rate for the second earner
(typically the wife), which increases her after-tax income and thus her bargaining power.
With a higher bargaining power, she can substitute less leisure time for work. The result
holds both theoretically and quantitatively. A more detailed summary of each chapter is
listed as follows:
Chapter 2 studies the effect of imbalanced sex ratios on female and male welfare in
China. The ratio of men relative to women has surged significantly during the last 30 years
in China. In this chapter, I quantify the effect of an increased sex ratio in China on female
and male welfare through marriage and labor market outcomes. Specifically, I develop
a unified model of marriage and divorce, imbalanced sex ratios, and intra-household
bargaining. The model highlights three channels through which the sex ratio affects
female and male welfare. First, since the sex ratio affects the outside option of marriage
differently across gender, it alters the bargaining power within the household, which
in turn changes the allocation of the marital surplus. Second, females have a higher
likelihood of meeting a husband, and marriage is beneficial. Third, females can find better
husbands as they become more selective in choosing husbands. The model is calibrated
to match Chinese labor and marriage market data moments in 1990. A quantitative
exercise of increasing the sex ratio from 1.07 to 1.2 shows that females are 9.5% better off
while males are 14% worse off in consumption equivalent units measured by a new-born
individual who is about to enter the marriage market. The change comes from variations
of working hours and marriage rates. Total female working hours drop by 5.1% and total
male working hours rise by 5.2%. The fraction of females that are married increases by
2.6 percentage points and that of males decreases by 7 percentage points. The model
predictions are mostly in line with the actual data trend. Decomposing the results, I find
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that the channel of a higher meeting probability for females contributes most in explaining
the change of welfare.
Chapter 3 investigates the effect of an imbalanced sex ratio in China on the marriage
market, the labor market and intra-household bargaining empirically. In this chapter, I
provide empirical evidence that the imbalanced sex ratio affects the marriage and labor
market and further improves female bargaining power. Specifically, I use county-level
variations in sex ratios to study its impact on marriage market outcomes, female labor
supply, intra-household allocations and female bargaining power. I find that the higher
sex ratio is associated with a higher fraction of women ever married and a lower fraction of
men ever married. In addition, female bargaining power increases with the sex ratio. With
a higher bargaining power, wives reduce their labor force participation and housework
hours, and they become healthier. All empirical findings are consistent with the model
predictions in Chapter 2.
Chapter 4 analyzes the effect of a counter-factual tax reform on married female labor
supply when her bargaining power is endogenous. The joint income taxation for married
households in the U.S. imposes a higher marginal tax rate on the second earner, which
is typically the wife. Therefore, policy makers have proposed a tax reform regarding
individual taxation to stimulate married female labor supply and improve intra-household
equality. In this chapter, I study the effect of this counter-factual tax reform on married
female labor supply, taking its impact on the relative bargaining power into consideration.
If the relative after-tax income affects the bargaining power, two additional effects will
influence the female labor supply decision. On the one hand, a direct effect reduces her
labor supply since the higher bargaining power enables her to enjoy more leisure time. On
the other hand, an indirect effect increases her labor supply because the more she earns,
the higher bargaining power she obtains, which in turn gives her an additional incentive to
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work. The total effect depends on the magnitude of both effects. Calibrating the model to
match the U.S. households working hours data, I find that this tax reform could generate
a higher female labor supply. However, the magnitude is not as high as predicted in
previous studies that do not consider the change in female bargaining power. Therefore,
the direct effect dominates the indirect effect. The welfare implications reverse when
female bargaining power is endogenous, where the female gains if her bargaining power
changes after the tax reform but loses if it is fixed. The effect is stronger for non-college
educated women.
4

2 What is the Effect of Imbalanced
Sex Ratios on Women and Men in
China?
‘
2.1 Introduction
The sex ratio, which is defined by the number of males per 100 females, has increased
significantly in China since 1980. The driving force comes from the male-biased sex ratio
at birth, especially after the implementation of the One Child Policy in 1978.1 Figure 2.1
illustrates that the sex ratio at birth increased from natural levels of around 105 in the
1980s, to over 120 in the 2000s.2 Such evolution significantly alters the composition of
the population in China. According to the 2015 China Statistical Yearbook, there were
over 33 million more men than women in China, and this number is still increasing. Such
a gap could generate a significant impact on China’s marriage and labor market, and
1The reason why the sex ratio is increasing is not the focus of this study, but Li, Yi, and Zhang (2011)
and Bulte, Heerink, and Zhang (2011) find that 50% to 90% of the imbalanced sex ratio can be
explained by the implement of the One Child Policy in China. Qian (2008) argues that the increased
male to female income worsens female survival rates in China.
2The World Health Organization computes the statistics based on the UN World Population Prospect
from 1990 to 2010, and suggests that the average number is 105. See http://www.searo.who.int/
entity/health_situation_trends/data/chi/sex-ratio/en/.
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possibly affect women and men differently. For this reason, this chapter examines the
question, “What is the effect of the imbalanced sex ratio on female and male welfare?”
Source: China population Census and 1% population sample surveys
Figure 2.1: Sex Ratio at Birth in China
To answer this question, in this chapter I develop a unified model with three main
features: a random matching process in the marriage market with endogenous marriage
and divorce decisions, imbalanced sex ratios, and an intra-household bargaining process.
Firstly, the marriage market is defined by a random matching process where single agents
meet randomly with individuals of the opposite sex according to a meeting probability
function. Marriage occurs if, and only if, both parties agree to marry. Divorce happens
when one of the spouses wants to divorce. Secondly, the meeting probability depends
on the population size of singles, which is a function of the sex ratio. Lastly, the intra-
household allocation is determined by a Nash bargaining process, with being single as the
outside option. Given that divorce is a credible threat, being single is more attractive to
the female and consequently it raises her bargaining power.3
3The crude divorce rate, which is defined by the number of divorces per 1000 population, increased from
0.7 in 1990 to 2.8 in 2015 in China. In U.S. this number in 2014 was 3.2, suggesting that divorce is a
valid threat in marriage.
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The main contribution of this study is to provide a mechanism that links the sex ratio
with the well-being of men and women. The mechanism can also explain the decreased
female labor supply and the increased female marriage rate in the data. In particular,
the impact of the imbalanced sex ratio on female and male welfare passes through three
channels. These three channels are the bargaining channel, the meeting probability channel
and the better husband channel. The bargaining channel works as follows: Given a larger
male population size, when divorce is feasible, a married female may credibly threaten
to get divorced. In addition, since females are scarcer, it is harder for the husband to
find another wife if he is divorced. Therefore, such a threat can provide a better outside
option for the female, which increases her bargaining power.4 The higher bargaining
power enables the female to enjoy a larger share of the marital surplus in the form of a
reduction in working hours and more leisure time, which makes females better off.
The meeting probability channel directly affects the marriage market. When there are
more males available, it is easier for females to find a husband. Given that marriage is
beneficial due to the love shock and economies of scale, females are better off.
The better husbands channel affects welfare through an income effect. When there are
more males available, females become more selective in choosing their husbands. The
additional income effect of better husbands also makes them better off.
The model is calibrated to match the Chinese labor and marriage market statistics in
1990 using the minimum distance estimation method. In the experiment, the sex ratio
is adjusted exogenously to the 2007 level while the other parameters are held constant.
To investigate the effect of the imbalanced sex ratio, I compare model predictions for
2007 with the corresponding 1990 outcomes. Results suggest that the imbalanced sex
ratio has a significant impact on female and male welfare. On average, females are 9.5%
better off in consumption equivalent units, while males are 14.42% worse off. The change
4Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) study the intra-household allocation in a collective model
framework. They validate the sex ratio in the marriage market as a distribution factor, which affects
the intra-household bargaining position.
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results from variations in labor market and marriage market outcomes. On the one hand,
married female daily working hours drop from 7.71 hours to 7.38 hours. On the other
hand, the fraction of females that are married increases from 80.94% to 83.54%. Both
model predictions are in line with actual data trends. In contrast, married male working
hours rise from 7.96 hours to 8.7 hours per day, and the fraction of men that are married
falls from 76.65% to 69.62%.
The three channels previously mentioned contribute to higher female welfare. To
investigate the role of each channel in the welfare change, I conduct a decomposition
exercise by turning on each of the channels separately. Results suggest that women are
mostly better off from the meeting probability channel, which accounts for about 60% of
the increase. The higher female bargaining power explains about one-third of the welfare
change. Females benefit from an average 12.05% increase in bargaining power, which
enables them to obtain a larger share of the marital surplus by enjoying more leisure
time and working less. On average, married women reduce working hours by 0.26 hours
per day due to higher bargaining power. Compared with these two channels, females
only benefit marginally from a better husband, which contributes to an 0.12% increase in
female welfare. Due to the income effect from the husband, married females reduce their
working hours by 0.07 hours. The effect on male welfare works the other way around.
This study contributes to the literature on sex ratios, marriage decision, and intra-
household allocations. In the vein of the effect of sex ratios on marriage market outcomes,
Becker (1973, 1974) first established the theory of the marriage market. Becker’s theory
uses a transferable utility model to argue that the change of sex ratios affects relative
supply and demand in the marriage market. The theory is supported by recent empirical
studies. Angrist (2002) documents that the imbalanced sex ratio of the second generation
of immigrants in the U.S. led to a higher likelihood of female marriage. Abramitzky,
Delavande, and Vasconcelos (2011) use WWI as an exogenous negative mortality shock
to the male population and find that during the post WWI-period, men had a higher
9
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likelihood of marriage in France. Similar results are found in China, where the imbalanced
sex ratio increases women’s probability of getting married (Edlund et al. (2013), Porter
(2016)). My model framework provides a mechanism that can explain such empirical
findings.
The other strand of literature focuses on the impact of sex ratios on intra-household
allocations. Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) extend the Beckerian framework to a
collective model, where the sex ratio is one of the distribution factors that affect the intra-
household bargaining position. I extend the model to a Nash bargaining framework, and
the results are consistent with their findings. Du and Wei (2010) investigate theoretically
that the imbalanced sex ratio leads to a competitive savings behavior among males to
increase their attractiveness in the marriage market, which contributes to the higher savings
rate. Wei and Zhang (2011) further empirically validate Du and Wei (2010)’s theory in the
case of China, suggesting that the imbalanced sex ratio affects intra-household allocations.
Empirically, the negative effect of sex ratios on female labor force participation has been
identified in the U.S., Australia and China (Angrist (2002), Grosjean and Khattar (2018)
and Edlund et al. (2013)). This study further provides a quantitative support of the role
of sex ratios in intra-household allocations.
The second contribution of this study is the quantitative model framework. To my
knowledge, this is the first study that provides a unified quantitative model with imbalanced
sex ratios, marriage and divorce decisions and an intra-household bargaining process. The
matching model of the marriage market has been applied in many quantitative studies
(Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (2000), Greenwood et al. (2016)), but these studies
usually treat a married household as one decision unit and ignore the interaction within
the household. Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles (2003) incorporate a Nash bargaining
framework into the married household decision problem to quantify the marriage and
fertility effect on the distribution of income. The intra-household bargaining is further
extended and implemented in quantitative works by Siegel (2017), Knowles (2013) and
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Voena (2015), but they all assume a one-to-one matching between two genders in the
marriage market. The only quantitative studies with imbalanced sex ratios are Knowles
and Vandenbroucke (2015) and Rıos-Rull, Seitz, and Tanaka (2013), but both papers only
study marriage market outcomes and ignore intra-household decisions.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the model setup.
Section 2.3 presents the calibration procedure. The experiment of an increased sex ratio is
discussed in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 decomposes the effect on welfare into three channels.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Model setup
2.2.1 Demographics
The economy is populated by males (m) and females (f), who are different in population
sizes. They are either single (S) or married (M). Denote the single female population
size to be Sf and the number of single males to be Sm. Similarly, the married counterpart
is given by Mf and Mm.5 The sex ratio is imbalanced, denoted by φ > 1, which varies
exogenously. The female population is normalized to be 1, and therefore the male
population is φ.
Agents face a mortality risk at the rate of δ. It is assumed to be the same for all agents.
For married couples, they die together. Upon death, the individual will be replaced
by a new-born doppelganger. Each period δ amount of females is replaced, while the
replaced male population size is δφ due to the imbalanced sex ratio. The new-born
individual is endowed with the same productivity (zm and zf) as the dead counterpart,
and the productivity levels are drawn from distributions zf ∈ Zf and zm ∈ Zm. Once the
productivity is drawn, it remains constant in his/her lifetime.
5The time index is suppressed for simplicity.
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2.2.2 Preferences
Agents derive utility from consumption (c) and leisure time. Each person has one unit of
time endowment each period, and it can be divided between market work (`) and leisure.
Consumption is assumed to be a public good, which captures the economies of scale of a
married family.6
The utility function is separable and a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) over
consumption and disutility of labor.7 It takes the functional form of:
U(c, `) = c
1−γ
1− γ − ψg
`1+µ
1 + µ,
where γ is the inverse of the consumption elasticity, µ is inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply, and ψg captures the disutility of labor, which is gender specific.8
6I assume that consumption is jointly utilized by both spouses. Some examples of goods consumed
are houses, children and home appliances, which can be non-exclusively shared by both spouses.
Public consumption within married households is considered to be a large component of household
consumption (Lam (1988), Lundberg and Pollak (2007) Becker and Becker (2009) and Browning,
Chiappori, and Lewbel (2013)).
7Home production is ignored in the model for two reasons. First of all, there are no data available on
home production time before 2010, which is not the period of interest. In addition, my mechanism still
works with home production. As will be discussed later, wives work less. But the reduced working
hours are replaced by leisure time instead of home production due to the higher female bargaining
power. With the higher bargaining power, females can enjoy more leisure time instead of working
more in either the market or the home.
8The disutility of labor parameter ψg is set to be gender-specific because I assume that there is a
gender wage gap that will generate much lower married female working hours than male hours in the
model. But in the data, married female working hours are almost the same as husbands’, so I need at
least another parameter to lower female working hours to match the data. The disutility of labor
parameters are the most suitable choices.
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2.2.3 Budgets
Denote the exogenous wage rate to be w. Assume that there is a gender wage gap κ
between males and females as females only earn a fraction of male wage rate:
wm = w
wf = κwm
Within each period, the agent consumes all the labor income, so the budget constraint
of a single agent of gender g is given by:
c = wgzg`.
Married households pool their income together for their public consumption:
c = wmzm`m + wfzf`f
2.2.4 Marriage
The marriage market is characterized by a random matching process between singles of
the opposite sex. Within each period, a single agent has a chance of meeting a potential
spouse in the marriage market. The meeting probabilities depend on the share of the
single population of the opposite sex (Schoen (1981)):
ωf =
Sm
Sf + Sm
ωm =
Sf
Sf + Sm
.
Note that the meeting probability is endogenous as a function of the distribution of
singles, which is determined by the sex ratio. When the sex ratio is more imbalanced,
13
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single females will have a higher likelihood of meeting a partner while single males are
more likely to find no match. If singles do not meet anyone, they stay in the single pool.
Once the two potential spouses meet, they draw a match-specific marriage quality shock
q ∈ Q from a distribution F (q). To be more specific, q ∼ N(qs, σ2s), where qs and σs
represent the mean and standard deviation of the marriage quality shock distribution
for an unmarried couple. Within the marriage, the marriage quality shock is assumed
to follow the distribution G(q′|q), which evolves according to an autoregressive progress
given by:
q′ = (1− ρm)qm + ρmq + σm
√
1− ρ2mσ,
where qm and σm represent the long-run mean and standard deviation, ρm is the autocor-
relation coefficient, and σ ∼ N(0, 1).
If both agents accept the marriage, they get married, but if either agent rejects the
marriage, they have to stay single. The incentive of getting married exists in economies
of scale due to public consumption and the marriage quality shock. When the marriage
quality shock for the married households updates, the married couple decide whether to
stay in the marriage or get divorced. If one of them wants to get divorced, they become
single.
2.2.5 Intra-household allocations
The consumption and labor choice of single households is static. For a given gender g,
he/she maximizes his/her period utility given the budget constraint:
U(c, `) = max
c,`
c1−γ
1− γ − ψ
`1+µ
1 + µ
s.t. c = wgzg` (2.1)
For married households, the intra-household allocation is determined through a Nash
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bargaining process. Since divorce is a credible threat, being single is the outside option of
the bargaining. Therefore, the consumption and labor decision of married households is
given by:
max
cM ,`f ,`m
(V Mm (zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g)− V Sm(zm;Sg, S−g))(V Mf (zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g)− V Sf (zf ;Sg, S−g))
s.t. cM = wmzm`m + wfzf`f , (2.2)
where V Mm , V Sm and V Mf , V Sf are value functions of men and women being married and
being single respectively. The value functions will be defined in detail later.9 Note that
the value of being single is a function of the meeting probability ωg, which depends on the
single population distributions. A higher sex ratio will increase the single male population
size and thus the likelihood for a female of meeting a spouse. Given the benefit of marriage,
the value of being single for females goes up. Therefore, females face a better outside
option, which increases her bargaining power. With a higher bargaining power, she can
obtain a larger share of the marital surplus within the household, by enjoying more leisure
time.
2.2.6 Value functions
2.2.6.1 Value of being single
Now let me define the value function of being single. Consider a single agent of gender g ∈
{f,m} with productivity type zg. The aggregate states of single population distributions
are Sg and S−g. Given the optimal allocation of single households in the current period,
which generates the indirect utility US∗g (zg;Sg, S−g), the individual enters the next period
with a discount factor β and the survival probability 1 − δ. In the next period, the
9Given this functional form, I assume an equal bargaining weight on both spouses. However, it does not
mean that the bargaining power is equal. In fact, the bargaining power is endogenous and depends on
the outside option. As will be shown later, under current assumptions, the bargaining power can be
measured by a function of value functions, and it varies with the sex ratio.
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individual has ωg(Sg, S−g) probability of meeting the potential spouse given the normalized
distribution of the partner Sˆ−g(z−g;Sg, S−g), which will be defined later. Once they meet,
they draw a common marriage quality shock q from the distribution F (q). They will get
married if, and only if, both of them are better off being married than being single:
V Mg (zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g) ≥ V Sg (zg;Sg, S−g) and V M−g (zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g) ≥ V S−g(z−g;Sg, S−g)
(2.3)
Let the indicator function 1g(zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g) represent the marriage decision. It
equals 1 if both want to get married and equals 0 if one of them rejects.
1g(zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g) =

1, if (2.3) holds,
0, otherwise
(2.4)
Note that 1g(zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g) = 1−g(zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g) given that the marriage deci-
sion is a joint decision of both spouses.
If the individual does not meet anyone with probability 1− ωg(Sg, S−g), he/she has to
stay single.
Therefore, for gender g ∈ {f,m}, the value function of being single is given by:
V Sg (zg;Sg, S−g) = US∗g (zg;Sg, S−g)
+β(1− δ){
∫
Q
∫
Z
[ωg(Sg, S−g)V Mg (zf , zm, q;Sg, S−g)1g(zf , zm, q;Sg, S−g)
+ωg(Sg, S−g)(1− 1g(zf , zm, q;Sg, S−g))V Sg (zg;Sg, S−g)
+(1− ωg(Sg, S−g))V Sg (zg;Sg, S−g)]dSˆ−g(z−g;Sg, S−g)dF (q)}, (2.5)
where Sˆg(zg;Sg, S−g) is the normalized distribution of singles with gender g, which is
given by:
Sˆg(zg;Sg, S−g) =
Sg(zg)∫
Zg
Sg(zg)
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The first term in the continuation value stands for the case that both spouses agree
to get married. The second term represents the case that at least one of the potential
spouses rejects the marriage. The last term describes the case that the individual does
not meet anyone. The sex ratio affects not only the meeting probability ωg(Sg, S−g), but
also the normalized distribution Sˆ−g(z−g;Sg, S−g).
2.2.6.2 Value of being married
The value function of being married is defined similarly to the value of being single.
Consider a married individual of gender g. The couple’s productivity type combination is
given by zf and zm, and the realization of marriage quality shock to both spouses is q.
The aggregate state variables are the single population distributions Sg and S−g. Given
the optimal intra-household allocation derived from the Nash bargaining problem defined
in equation (2.2), the married individual obtains the indirect utility UM∗g (zf , zm;Sg, S−g).
On top of it, there is a utility gain of q from the marriage quality shock. In the next
period, the marriage quality shock q updates to q′ according to the distribution G(q′|q),
and the two spouses decide whether to get divorced or not.
Divorce occurs if one of the two spouses wants to get divorced:
V Mg (zf , zm, q;Sg, S−g) < V Sg (zg;Sg, S−g) or V M−g (zf , zm, q;Sg, S−g) < V S−g(z−g;Sg, S−g)
(2.6)
Therefore, the indicator function 1g(zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g) = 1 if they both want to stay
married, and takes the value of 0 if any of them wants to get divorced.
1g(zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g) =

1, if (2.6) holds,
0, otherwise
(2.7)
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So for gender g ∈ {f,m}, the value function of being married is specified as follows:
V Mg (zf , zm, q;Sg, S−g) = UM∗g (zf , zm;Sg, S−g) + q
+β(1− δ){
∫
Q
[V Mg (zf , zm, q′;Sg, S−g)1g(zf , zm, q′;Sg, S−g)
+V Sg (zg;Sg, S−g)(1− 1g(zf , zm, q′;Sg, S−g))]dG(q′|q)}, (2.8)
where the first term in the continuation value illustrates the case of remaining in marriage,
and the second term represents divorce.
2.2.7 Timing
The timing within a period is illustrated in Figure 2.2. At any period, a single agent of
gender g ∈ {f,m} and productivity zg first meets the potential spouse of productivity
type z−g with probability ωg. If they meet, they draw a common marriage quality shock
q. If he/she does not meet anyone, he/she makes a consumption and labor choice as
a single household by equation (2.1). For those who meet, they decide whether to get
married or not by comparing the value of being married with the value of being single
according to equation (2.3). For those who are already married, once their marriage
quality shock updates from q to q′, they renegotiate the intra-household allocation by
equation (2.2) as well as the divorce decision by equation (2.6). As the marriage decision
and intra-household bargaining take place at the same time, the threat of divorce affects
intra-household bargaining.
2.2.8 The stationary equilibrium
The married household allocations are determined by a Nash bargaining process, where the
outside option is being single. As discussed above, the value of being single is a function
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Figure 2.2: Timing of the Model
of the meeting probability. Since the meeting probability depends on the distribution of
singles, it requires the knowledge of steady state population distributions.
The steady state distribution of the single female is defined by:
Sf (z′f ) = (1− δ)ωf (Sf , Sm)
∫
Q
∫
Zm
∫ z′f
Zf
[1− 1f (zf , zm, q;Sf , Sm)]dSf (zf )dSˆm(zm;Sf , Sm)dF (q)
+(1− δ)
∫
Q
∫
Q
∫
Zm
∫ z′f
Zf
[1− 1f (zf , zm, q;Sf , Sm)]dMf (zf , zm, q−1)dG(q|q−1)
+(1− δ)(1− ωf (Sf , Sm))
∫ z′f
Zf
dSf (zf )
+δ, (2.9)
The first term represents single females who survived the last period, meet a male but
do not get married in this period. The second term captures females whose marriages
dissolve. The third term stands for single females who fail to meet any male. The last
term is the death replacement. Since the female population size is normalized to be 1,
and all females face the same mortality rate δ, the death replacement is simply δ.
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Analogously, the distribution of single males is defined by:
Sm(z′m) = (1− δ)ωm(Sf , Sm)
∫
Q
∫
Zf
∫ z′m
Zm
[1− 1m(zf , zm, q;Sg, S−g)]dSm(zm)dSˆf (zf ;Sf , Sm)dF (q)
+(1− δ)
∫
Q
∫
Q
∫
Zf
∫ z′m
Zm
[1− 1m(zf , zm, q;Sf , Sm)]dMm(zf , zm, q−1)dG(q|q−1)
+(1− δ)(1− ωm(Sf , Sm))
∫ z′m
Zm
dSm(zm)
+δφ (2.10)
The single male population is larger relative to single females due to the imbalanced sex
ratio. Since the male population is φ, given the same mortality rate, δφ number of males
is replaced by singles. The difference is captured by the last term in the distribution
function – the death replacement.10
The steady state distribution of the married individual of gender g is given by:
Mg(z′g, z′−g, q′) = (1− δ)ωg(Sg, S−g)
∫ q′
Q
∫ z′g
Zg
∫ z′−g
Z−g
1g(zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g)dSˆ−g(z−g;Sg, S−g)dSg(zg)dF (q)
+(1− δ)
∫ q′
Q
∫
Q
∫ z′g
Zg
∫ z′−g
Z−g
1g(zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g)dMg(zg, z−g, q−1)dG(q|q−1). (2.11)
The first term captures the survived individuals changing their marital status from
single to married. The second term measures the survived marriages. The marriage
market clears in the stationary equilibrium, which means Mf = Mm, and this condition
defines a fixed-point problem.
Now the stationary equilibrium of the economy can be defined as follows:
Definition 2.1: A stationary equilibrium is allocations for single and married house-
holds, cSg , `Sg , cM , `Mf and `Mm ; a set of value functions for singles and married individuals,
10Even though in each period there are more death replacements of males, the single male population
size is not explosive. To illustrate this, suppose there are 100 females and 110 males in the economy
and 80 of them are married. Therefore, the sex ratio is 1.1. Assume the mortality rate is 10%. Within
each period, 10 females are dead, 8 of which are married and 2 are single; 11 males are dead, 8 of
which are married and 3 are single. After the death replacement, there are 28 single females and 38
single males. As 8 of them get married in the next period, it generates a stationary equilibrium.
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V Sg (zg;Sg, S−g) and V Mg (zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g); a matching rule for singles and married cou-
ples 1g(zg, z−g, q); and stationary distributions of singles and married couples Sg(zg) and
Mg(zg, z−g, q) for g = m, f , such that the following conditions hold:
• The allocations cSg , `Sg solve the single household problem (2.1), and cM , `Mf and `Mm
solve the married household Nash bargaining problem (2.2).
• The value function V Sg (zg;Sg, S−g) defines the single’s problem (2.5) given her/his
indirect utility function USg (c∗g, `∗g) from problem (2.1), the value function for a
married person V Mg (zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g), the meeting probability ωg(Sg, S−g), the
matching rule for singles 1g(zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g), and the normalized distribution of
singles Sˆg(zg;Sg, S−g).
• The value function V Mg (zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g) defines the married person’s problem (2.8)
given her/his indirect utility function UMg (c∗g, `∗g) obtained from problem (2.2), the
value function for a single V Sg (zg;Sg, S−g), and the matching rule for a married
couple 1g(zg, z−g, q′).
• The matching rule 1(zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g) is determined by equations (2.4) and (2.7),
given the value functions V Sg (zg;Sg, S−g) and V Mg (zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g).
• The stationary distributions Sg(zg) and Mg(zg, z−g, q) evolve according to equations
(2.9), (2.10) and (2.11) given the matching rule 1g(zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g).
2.2.9 Solving the Nash bargaining problem
Solving the model involves a complicated fixed-point problem. On the one hand, the
allocations of married households require knowledge of value functions that depend on
the meeting probability and distributions. On the other hand, the distributions depend
on optimal allocations and value functions.
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It is challenging to solve the Nash problem directly given the Nash product of value
functions of the two counterparts. However, since a Nash problem is Pareto optimal, the
Nash problem defined in (2.2) can be mapped to a Pareto frontier. Therefore, the Nash
problem can be transformed into a maximization problem of a weighted sum of utilities,
whose solution pins down the allocation on the Pareto frontier:
max
c,`f ,`m
θUf (c, `f ) + (1− θ)Um(c, `m)
s.t. c = wmzm`m + wfzf`f , (2.12)
where θ = V
M
m (zg ,z−g ,q;Sg ,S−g)−V Sm(zm;Sg ,S−g)
(VMm (zg ,z−g ,q;Sg ,S−g)−V Sm(zm;Sg ,S−g))+(VMf (zg ,z−g ,q;Sg ,S−g)−V Sf (zf ;Sg ,S−g))
.
Lemma 2.1: When consumption is a public good, the Nash bargaining problem of a
married household defined in equation (2.2) is equivalent to the problem of maximizing
the weighted sum of utilities defined in equation (2.12).
Proof: see Appendix 2.A.
θ is the Pareto weight attached to the wife, which measures her bargaining power in
the household. If the marriage is feasible, θ lies between 0 and 1. Upon a match, θ < 0
if the male wants to stay single, and θ > 1 if the female does not want to accept the
marriage. Note that the weight is endogenous, which depends on states (zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g).
One can obtain a higher bargaining power if he/she has a higher productivity level, a
lower realization of the marriage quality shock, or a smaller single population size, as it
increases the value of being single and thus leads to a better outside option. As the sex
ratio increases, the value of being single for females goes up, which leads to a higher value
of θ, so female bargaining power rises.
The detailed algorithm to solve the structural model is explained in Appendix 2.B.
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2.3 Calibration
To analyze the impact of changing sex ratios on marriage market and labor market
outcomes, I solve the model numerically. The base year for calibration is set to 1990.
Although the sex ratio started to increase after the implementation of the One Child
Policy in 1978, I still use 1990 as the base year for two reasons. Firstly, the sex ratio in
1990 was 1.072, which is close to the natural sex ratio of 1.05. Secondly, the labor supply
data at the intensive margin is only available after 1989. Therefore, I choose 1990 as
the base year where I have information on individual gender, marital status, educational
level and working hours. The microdata sets from which I extract information are the
1990 Chinese Census and the 1991 China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The
data targets are working hours of married individuals, the fraction of individuals that
are married, and the marital sorting of different educational groups. Some parameters
are assigned using a priori information, while the remaining parameters are calibrated to
match data moments by the minimum distance estimation method.
In the next section, the model is simulated by using the sex ratio in 2007 to access the
role of the imbalanced sex ratio in marriage and labor market outcomes. The reason why
the year 2007 is chosen as the reference year is that the sex ratio reached its peak of 1.2
in 2007. It is assumed that the economy is at steady state in both reference years.
2.3.1 Parameters based on a priori information
Some of the parameters are taken directly from the literature or from independent evidence.
These parameters are summarized in Table 2.1.
The utility function parameters are taken from the literature, where the inverse of the
consumption elasticity is γ = 2 as in Hall (1988) and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity is
µ = 3 as estimated by Chetty et al. (2011). The length of a model period is 1 year, so the
discount factor takes the value of β = 0.96. Since I am interested in the marriage and labor
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Table 2.1: Pre-determined parameter values
Parameters Value Explanation
Utility
γ 2 Inverse of consumption elasticity (Hall (1988))
µ 3 Inverse of Frisch elasticity (Chetty et al. (2011))
β 0.96 Discount factor
δ 1/33 Normalized mortality rate between age 18 and 50
κ 0.80 Gender wage gap (Zhang et al. (2005))
φ 1.072 Sex ratio (1990 Census)
z_f, z_m
1 Educational premium
1.075 (less than primary school=1, primary completed=1.075,
1.191 secondary completed=1.191, university completed=1.375)
1.375 (Liu (1998) and Zhang et al. (2005))
Z_f
0.3035
Distribution of female education (1990 Census)0.57820.1148
0.0035
Z_m
0.1433
Distribution of male education (1990 Census)0.68210.166
0.0086
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market outcomes, the population I am focusing on is between 18 and 50 years old, which
corresponds to an average lifespan of 33 years.11 So the mortality rate being δ = 1/33 gives
an average life expectancy of 33 years. All data targets for the estimation are calculated
for the population within this age range. The gender wage gap was κ = 0.8 in 1990, taken
from Zhang et al. (2005), who control for the educational level and experience. According
to the 1990 China Census, the sex ratio of the age group of interest was φ = 1.072.
Lastly, the levels and distributions of productivity are measured by educational at-
tainment. The productivity types are classified into 4 categories, which correspond to
“Less than primary school”, “Primary school completed”, “Secondary school completed”
and “University completed”. The productivity level zg is measured by the education
premium, and it is assumed to be identical between women and men who have the same
educational level. The productivity level of “Less than primary school” is normalized to 1.
As estimated by Liu (1998) and Zhang et al. (2005), the education premium of “Primary
school completed”, “Secondary school completed” and “University completed” relative to
“Less than primary school” on average is 7.5%, 19.1% and 37.5% respectively between
1989 and 1992. Therefore, the productivity levels are z = {1, 1.075, 1.191, 1.375} for these
four categories.
The distributions of educational attainment Zg are taken directly from the 1990 Census
data. They are different between women and men. In 1990, men on average had a
higher educational attainment than women. For males, 14.33% of them had less than
primary school education, 68.21% complete primary school, 16.6% finished their secondary
education, and 0.86% had a college degree or above (Zm = {0.1433, 0.6821, 0.166, 0.0086}).
For females, 30.35% of them did not complete primary education, 57.82% had their
primary education finished, 11.48% completed secondary school, and only 0.35% obtained
a college degree or higher (Zf = {0.3035, 0.5782, 0.11148, 0.0035}).
11In China, the official female retirement age is between 50 and 55. Therefore, I restrict the population
of interest to be under 50 years old to avoid forced retirement.
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2.3.2 Parameters estimated by the minimum distance
estimation method
The remaining 7 parameters, namely 2 disutility of labor parameters {ψf , ψm} and 5
marriage quality shock parameters {qs, σs qm, σm, ρm}, are estimated by the minimum
distance estimation method.
The data targets are: (i) married female and male working hours, (ii) marriage market
outcomes.
The working hours of married women and men are calculated from the 1991 CHNS
data. The data set reports the average hours an individual worked per day from the last
year (1990). The married population is defined by currently married or cohabiting couples,
while the single population includes those who never married, are separated/divorced, and
widowed. Note that the fraction of the population with a college degree or higher was very
small in the 1990 Census data, and the number of college graduates in the 1991 CHNS
data set was even smaller (less than 80). So instead of targeting the working-hours data
for each education group, I take the average married female and male working hours as
two calibration targets.12 On average, married females and married males worked almost
the same number of hours (approximately 8 hours) per day.13
The marriage market outcomes I focus on are the fraction of females that are married
and the assortative mating pattern, which is measured by the number of marriages for all
possible combinations of education between two spouses. The data targets of marriage
market outcomes are calculated from the 1990 Census data. Given the sex ratio and the
fraction of females that are married, when the female population size is normalized to be 1,
the fraction of males that are married can be directly obtained from a back-of-the-envelope
12The 1991 CHNS also reports the number of days and months an individual works. I also normalize the
average weekly working hours and the average yearly working hours into daily hours for comparison.
After the normalization, there is very little difference between husbands and wives’ working hours in
all the results. Therefore, I directly use the average daily working hours as data targets, which is also
a more precise measure of working hours.
13Zero working hour data are also included in the calculation.
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calculation. Therefore, I do not take the fraction of males that are married as a data
target. In the data, about 81% of females are married.
In terms of the sorting pattern, the number of marriages with one partner being highly
educated was very low relative to the other groups since there were less than 1% of the
population with a college degree. Therefore, I normalize the assortative mating targets by
dividing the number of marriages of each education combination by the married female
population size for each female educational level. The normalization eliminates the effect
of the long tail of the education distribution. As a result, for every female educational
level, the measure of assortative mating sums up to 1.14 After the normalization, most
marriages occur between husbands and wives with the same educational level.
In total, I have 19 data targets. Two of them capture labor market outcomes, which
are the married female working hours and the married male working hours. The other 17
data targets are marriage market outcomes. One of them captures the overall fraction of
the population that are married, which is the fraction of females that are married. The
other 16 represent the assortative mating pattern.
Let η be the vector of 7 parameters to be estimated, and g(η) be the vector of moments
generated by the model as a function of parameters. Denote gdata be the vector of 19
data moments obtained from the 1991 CHNS and 1990 Census. So the vector of distances
between data moments and model moments is given by G(η) = gdata − g(η).15 Then the
minimum distance estimator is defined as:
ηˆ = arg min
η
G(η)′WG(η),
14The normalization by the population size of each educational group combination is crucial in the
calibration to capture marriage market outcomes. One example is, after the normalization, the share
of marriages with the same education level prevails in the college-educated groups (as shown in Table
2.3). However, without the normalization, it would only account for 0.2% of the population.
15Here I use the absolute deviation instead of the percentage deviation because the data targets are more
or less in the same magnitude. The working hours are normalized to be between 0 and 1, and the
other targets are measured by shares, which are also between 0 and 1.
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where W is a positive semi-definite weighting matrix.16
Table 2.2 reports the calibrated parameter values.
Table 2.2: Calibrated parameters
Parameters Explanation Value
ψf Disutility of labor of female 16.136
ψm Disutility of labor of male 19.755
qs Mean of single’s marriage quality distribution -0.4964
qm Mean of married marriage quality distribution 0.399
ρm Persistence of married marriage quality distribution 0.9654
σs Variance of single’s marriage quality distribution 2.0586
σm Variance of married marriage quality distribution 1.0065
Females have a lower disutility of labor than males (16.136 versus 19.755). The lower
disutility of labor leads to a higher number of female working hours, while the gender wage
gap discourages her to work. Therefore, the model is able to generate similar working
hours between husbands and wives to match the data. The mean of the marriage quality
shock for singles is negative (qs = −0.4964). As consumption in the married household is
a public good, which is already enough to motivate singles to get married, the negative
value of the love shock offsets some of the benefits from marriage to match the marriage
market data. The variance of the marriage quality shock for singles is larger than that for
already married individuals (2.0586 versus 1.0065), which gives singles incentive to wait
longer until they meet a better match. Once the two meeting partners get married, the
marriage quality shock is very persistent (ρm = 0.9654).
The performance of the model is illustrated in Table 2.3, where the model moments
and data moments are displayed. Overall, the model can replicate many of the data
moments. The working hours can be matched well. The model can also mimic the overall
marriage market as the fraction of females that are married is relatively well matched. In
16The weights are chosen such that I put equal weight on the labor market targets and marriage market
targets. Since there are only 2 labor market moments and 17 marriage market moments, I set the
weights on married female and male working hours to be 8.5 and the weights on each of the marriage
market targets to be 1.
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terms of the sorting pattern of the model, it can capture the hump-shaped assortative
mating pattern for lower-educated female groups, where most marriages take place when
the husband has completed his primary education. Unfortunately however, some of
the assortative mating moments are off the target, especially for the highly-educated
groups. This mismatch has two possible explanations: Firstly, the population of the
higher-educated group is too small, which leads to a very low meeting probability between
higher-educated types in the model. Even if they would like to marry each other, there are
very few realized marriages given that they are unlikely to meet another college-educated
partner. In addition, the model is over-identified, as there are 19 data moments but only
7 parameters calibrated.
Table 2.3: Data and model moments
Statistics Data moment Model moment
Working hours
Wife 7.87 7.71
Husband 7.93 7.96
Marriage
Fraction of Married Females 0.809 0.806
Sorting (% of married females of each type) husband husband
wife <primary primary middle uni <primary primary middle uni
<primary 0.3532 0.5915 0.0551 0.0002 0.1474 0.7024 0.1421 0.0077
primary 0.048 0.7937 0.1556 0.1331 0.1423 0.706 0.1441 0.0076
middle 0.0139 0.3757 0.5688 0.0416 0.135 0.6428 0.2152 0.007
uni 0.0004 0.0453 0.2284 0.726 0.1168 0.5556 0.3101 0.0175
Data source: 1991 CHNS and 1990 Census
2.4 The impact of the imbalanced sex ratio in 2007
In this section, I simulate the model for 2007 by only changing the sex ratio to 1.2 exoge-
nously while holding the other parameters constant to access the role of the imbalanced
sex ratio. Then I compare the results of the two steady states.17 In particular, the
outcomes of interest are: (i) female and male welfare implications, (ii) female and male
17I only conduct the static comparison, because the model framework only allows me to compute variable
values in the stationary distribution. The transition path with marriage/divorce decisions can be
obtained in a life-cycle framework, for example by Knowles and Vandenbroucke (2015), but it is not
the main focus of this chapter.
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working hours, (iii) female and male marriage and divorce decisions and the degree of
assortative mating. The results are presented in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: The impact of the imbalanced sex ratio: model predictions
1990 2007
Welfare (% change)
Female 9.5%
Male -14.42%
Labor market
Total female working hours 8.08 7.67
Total male working hours 8.13 8.56
Married female working hours 7.71 7.38
Married male working hours 7.96 8.7
Marriage market
Fraction of married females 80.94% 83.54%
Fraction of married males 76.65% 69.62%
Marriage rate 2.07% 2.93%
Divorce rate 0.82% 0.93%
Reservation value of marriage quality, female -0.0439 -0.0374
Reservation value of marriage quality, male -0.045 -0.0483
Degree of assortative mating 0.456 0.4935
Other changes
Married household consumption 0.9541 0.9675
Female bargaining power 0.4895 0.5485
2.4.1 Effect on welfare
Since the population sizes in two stationary distributions are different, it is problematic
to measure the welfare change of the single and married population separately. A single
woman in the low sex ratio economy may be able to get married if she is in the high sex
ratio economy. Therefore, I take an ex-ante new-born agent who just enters the marriage
market as a reference.
Consider a new-born agent of gender g ∈ {f,m} with productivity type zg, who just
enters the economy as a single individual. The value function for the new-born individual
is given by:
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V˜g(zg;Sg, S−g) =
∫
Q
∫
Z
(ωg(Sg, S−g) max{V S∗g (zg;Sg, S−g), V M∗g (zg, z−g, q;Sg, S−g)}+
(1− ωg(Sg, S−g))V S∗g (zg;Sg, S−g))dSˆ−g(z−g)dF (q),
The new-born single agent meets a spouse of type z−g with probability ωg and draws
the marriage quality shock q. Given the optimal allocations of being single and being
married, the individual decides whether to get married by comparing the value of being
married with the value of being single. If the agent meets no one with probability 1− ωg,
he/she has to stay single.
Then the welfare change is measured in consumption equivalent units for the new-born
women and men. As illustrated in the first part of Table 2.4, on average, women benefit
from the more imbalanced sex ratio by gaining 9.5%. Three channels contribute to the
change. Firstly, the higher bargaining power enables married females to obtain a larger
share of the marital surplus by enjoying more leisure.18 Secondly, more females can get
married due to a higher probability of meeting a potential husband. Given the beneficiary
of marriage (economies of scale and the love shock), women gain even more. Thirdly,
some of the females can marry a better husband, and they benefit from the income effect.
In contrast, male welfare drops by 14.42%. It arises not only from the additional working
hours but more importantly from the lower likelihood of finding a wife. In the next
section, a decomposition exercise is conducted to illustrate the relative importance of each
channel.
18Household public consumption only plays a marginal role, which is almost constant (from 0.9541 to
0.9675).
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2.4.2 Effects on labor market
The “Labor market” part of Table 2.4 illustrates the impact of the increased sex ratio on
labor market outcomes. The model predicts that, on average, total female working hours
drop by 5.1% from 8.08 to 7.67 hours per day, and total male working hours increase by
5.2% from 8.13 to 8.56 hours per day. Two aspects can explain the change: First, the
higher female bargaining power enables wives to take more marital surplus by enjoying
more leisure time. Therefore, married female working hours fall.19 On the contrary,
husbands need to work more as his bargaining position worsens. Second, as will be
shown later, there is a compositional effect from the change of the share of the married
population. Given that married females work less than single females (8.08 vs. 9.47 hours
in the model) and more women are able to get married, total female labor supply falls.
The opposite happens to males.20
The model prediction is in line with the data trend. From 1990 to 2007, data suggest
that married female working hours dropped by 10.85% from 7.83 to 7.01 hours per day
(1991, 2006 CHNS). The model predicts the same direction of variation, where married
female working hours decrease from 7.71 to 7.38. The increased female bargaining power
in the intra-household allocation problem can explain most of the decline of married
female working hours. Husbands are willing to transfer more resources to wives so that
they will stay in the marriage. In the model setup, this is realized by husbands allowing
wives to work less and enjoy more leisure time. As measured by the Pareto weight θ,
female bargaining power has increased by 12.05% on average, and all types of females are
able to obtain a better bargaining position. Particularly lower educated women benefit
19If home production is included, female working hours should still fall due to the higher bargaining
power. Ignoring home production in the model will give an upper bound of the estimation of the
reduced married female labor supply.
20In the model, single household labor supply does not react to the sex ratio change, as the sex ratio
does not enter the single household optimization problem. On top of that, I assume there is no capital
accumulation and no change in wage rates, so single household labor supply does not change. In
the data, both single female and single male working hours fall by about 0.2 hours, which can be
explained by the income effect due to the increased wage rates.
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most, as illustrated in Table 2.5.21
Table 2.5: Change of female bargaining power by productivity type
<primary primary secondary college
1990 0.4761 0.4917 0.512 0.5456
2007 0.5378 0.55 0.5676 0.5953
% Change 12.96% 11.85% 10.85% 9.12%
Unfortunately, contradicting the data, the model predicts that husbands should increase
their working hours as their bargaining power falls. In the data, married male working
hours barely change. Two possible reasons can explain the difference. Firstly, empirical
studies find that the elasticity of female labor, especially married female labor, is higher
than male labor (Triest (1990), Eissa (1995) and Keane (2011)), so married male labor
supply reacts less to the change of the sex ratio. However, in my model, the Frisch
elasticity is assumed to be identical between women and men, which is standard in
quantitative studies (Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (2000), Greenwood, Guner, and
Knowles (2003) and Greenwood et al. (2016) etc.). Secondly, the only variation in the
model is the sex ratio from 1990 to 2007, and all the other parameters are fixed at the
1990 level. But during the period of interest, the distribution of education also shifts
to the right tail in the data, where a much larger share of the population can obtain a
higher educational level. The significantly increased return to education could be one
explanation in the drop of male working hours.22
2.4.3 Effect on marriage market
In 2007, more women were able to get married, and correspondingly, fewer men could
find a wife. In the data, the fraction of females that are married increased from 80.47%
21The income effect of marriage may play a less important role. Yao and Tan (2005) show that the
increased male income in China can only explain less than 10% of the drop in female labor supply.
22During this period, the gender wage gap was almost constant, which increased to 0.76 between 1990
and 1997, but fell to 0.78 in 2007.
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to 81.38%, and the fraction of males that are married dropped from 74.44% to 71.35%
(1990, 2010 Census). The model predicts the same trend as the data. In the model, the
fraction of females that are married increased from 80.94% in 1990 to 83.54% in 2007,
while the fraction of males that are married dropped from 76.65% to 69.62%. For females,
the changes happen due to: (i) the increased bargaining power making marriage more
attractive, and (ii) there being more males available on the marriage market, which gives
females a wider choice of husbands. The opposite happens to males.
According to the model, overall, the marriage rate increased from 2.07% in 1990 to
2.93% in 2007 due to the benefit of marriage. At the same time, the divorce rate rose from
0.82% to 0.93%. It is more likely for married couples to get divorced in the high sex ratio
economy since married women have a better outside option. The larger number of single
men available encourages married women to get divorced and wait for a better husband.
When the sex ratio is higher, women can also find a better husband. They become more
selective in finding a partner. Measured by the reservation value of the marriage quality
shock, females become 14.8% more selective while males become 7.3% less selective. The
change of selectivity can also be illustrated by Figure 2.3. It shows the marriage policy
functions of women and men separately for a given level of the marriage quality shock.
As shown in the top two graphs, when the sex ratio is higher, fewer females would like to
accept the marriage given the type of the potential husband. Since the marriage decision
is a joint decision, the fraction of males that are married decreased due to the increased
selectivity of females. For males, they become less selective, as shown by the bottom two
graphs in Figure 2.3. Instead, they were more willing to marry lower-educated females
than before.
The degree of assortative mating increases, which is measured by the fraction of married
couples who have the same education level. When the sex ratio is low, the model estimates
that 45.6% of couples have the same educational level, but this number increases to
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Figure 2.3: Marriage Policy Functions Before and After the Sex Ratio Changes
49.35% when the sex ratio reaches 1.2. Since males are less selective, and there are more
low-educated males available in the high sex ratio economy, more low-educated women
are able to find a husband. Therefore, the degree of assortative mating increases. This
finding is in line with the empirical literature (Edlund et al. (2013)).
2.5 Decomposition exercises
The effect of a higher sex ratio on female and male welfare passes through 3 channels:
the bargaining channel, the channel of women having a higher probability of meeting
husbands, and the channel of females finding a better husband. The bargaining channel is
captured by the bargaining weight θ, the higher meeting probability channel is represented
by the meeting probability ωg and the better husband channel is defined by the marriage
policy function 1g. To pin down the effect from each of the three channels, I use 1990 as
the benchmark year, then change the sex ratio to the level in 2007. Then I turn on each
channel separately while holding the other two channels fixed at the 1990 level. Therefore,
the effect of each channel can be captured by comparing each variable value with its 2007
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counterpart in column (5) of Table 2.6. The closer the two values are, the more important
the channel is in explaining the change. The results are shown in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Decomposition exercises
1990 Higher bargaining Higher meeting Better 2007
power prob. husband
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Welfare (% change)
Female 3.48% 5.93% 0.12% 9.5%
Male -5.43% -8.87% -0.02% -14.42%
Labor market
Working hours (wife) 7.71 7.45 7.71 7.64 7.38
Working hours (husband) 7.96 8.54 7.96 8.03 8.7
Marriage market
Fraction of females, married 80.94% 81.26% 84.62% 80.78% 83.54%
Fraction of males, married 76.65% 75.87% 70.51% 76.69% 69.62%
2.5.1 A higher female bargaining power only
The bargaining channel effect can be captured by the change of the endogenous bargaining
weight θ. To pin down the effect from this channel, I allow the weight to change according
to θ = VMm −V Sm(VMm −V Sm)+(VMf −V Sf ) while holding the meeting probability ωg and marriage policy
functions at the same level as 1990.23 Therefore, the bargaining weight varies with the
sex ratio, but single agents still have the same meeting probability of spouses, and once
they meet a potential spouse, they have to make the same marriage decision as if they
were in the low sex ratio economy. Then the model is simulated with the 2007 sex ratio.
The results are listed in the second column of Table 2.6.
The results suggest that the bargaining channel can explain about one-third of the
increased female welfare. Women are 3.48% better off, and men are −5.43% worse off
due to the variation in the bargaining power. The change results from a higher married
23Note that even when the meeting probability is fixed, the relative single population size still varies,
which affects the normalized single population distribution in the value function. Consequently, the
bargaining weight still changes with the sex ratio.
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fraction and lower working hours of females. The 78% change of the lower married female
labor supply can be explained by the higher bargaining power. For husbands, they have
to work 0.58 hours longer. Regarding the marriage market, the fraction of females that
are married increases by 0.32 percentage points, as the higher bargaining power makes
marriage more attractive to females. The fraction of men that are married drops by 0.78
percentage point as the marriage is less beneficial due to the lower bargaining power.
2.5.2 A higher meeting probability only
The higher meeting probability channel is measured by the change of the meeting proba-
bility ωg. In particular, the meeting probability evolves with the relative single population
size by ωg = S−gSg+S−g , while the bargaining weights and the marriage decision policies are
fixed at 1990 levels. As a result, single females have a higher meeting probability to meet
a husband, but once they meet, the marriage decision is still the same as in the low sex
ratio economy, and their bargaining power remains the same as before. Column (3) in
Table 2.6 presents the simulated outcomes.
The higher meeting probability channel is the most relevant channel to explain the
change of welfare. It contributes to 5.93% of female welfare gain and 8.87% of male welfare
loss. The effect is generated by the impact of the sex ratio on the marriage market. While
married individual working hours barely react to the increased sex ratio, the increased
meeting probability for women is essential in explaining the variation of marriage market
outcomes. It accounts for 3.68 percentage points in the increase in the fraction of females
that are married. On the contrary, fewer men are able to find a wife with 6.14 percentage
points. Compared with the utility gain from leisure, marriage is more beneficial due to
economies of scale and the love shock. Therefore, the change of the female and male
marriage behavior most affects their welfare.
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2.5.3 A better husband only
The better husbands channel is captured by allowing the marriage decision to be endoge-
nous while holding the bargaining weight and meeting probabilities constant at the 1990
level. Therefore, while the bargaining weights and the meeting probabilities are the same
as in the lower sex ratio economy, singles can choose to get married or to wait for a better
match. The results are illustrated in column (4) of Table 2.6.
Overall, the better husbands channel only plays a marginal role in the change of welfare.
Women are only 0.12% better off, and men are −0.02% worse off. When the marriage
decision is endogenous, married female labor supply falls by 0.07 hours. Due to the income
effect, the better husband enables the wife to work less. On the contrary, husbands work
0.07% more. The impact on the fraction of females and males that are married is also
small. More females choose to stay single by 0.16 percentage points, and the number of
men who can find a wife increases by 0.04 percentage points. This is because females are
more selective in choosing husbands and males are less selective.
2.6 Conclusion
The sex ratio in China has been growing significantly during the last 30 years. The
imbalanced sex ratio generates more than 30 million additional males than females, which
has a substantial impact on China’s labor and marriage market.
To investigate its effects, I develop a unified model of marriage and divorce, imbalanced
sex ratios, and an intra-household bargaining process. The intra-household allocation
problem of married households is determined by a Nash bargaining process with being
single as the outside option. Marriage is attractive for two reasons, the love shock and
economies of scale from household public consumption. The meeting probability in the
marriage market depends on the population size of singles of the opposite sex. Therefore,
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it is more likely for the scarcer gender to find a spouse. The sex ratio affects female
and male well-being through the bargaining channel, the channel of a higher meeting
probability of husbands, and the channel of finding a better husband. When the sex ratio
rises, it leads to a better outside option for females, which increases their bargaining power.
The higher bargaining power enables married women to enjoy more leisure. Besides, the
additional men in the marriage market make it easier for females to find a husband, and
in addition, to find a better husband, thus generating a stronger income effect. All of
them contribute to the change of welfare.
The model is calibrated to match the Chinese data moments in 1990 when the sex ratio
was low. The data targets are chosen to capture married households’ working hours and
marriage market patterns. The calibrated parameter values are reasonable, and the model
overall fits the data well. Then I increase the sex ratio exogenously to 1.2 to simulate 2007
outcomes. Results suggest that females are 9.5% better off due to the change in labor
and marriage market outcomes while males are 14.42% worse off. The change results
from variations of working hours and marriage rates. Total female working hours drop by
5.1% and total male working hours rise by 5.2%. The fraction of females that are married
increases by 2.6 percentage points and that of males decreases by 7 percentage points.
The degree of assortative mating rises with the sex ratio since females are more selective
in choosing their partners. The model predictions are broadly in line with the data trends.
In addition, a decomposition exercise is conducted to pin down the effects of the three
channels on welfare changes. The higher meeting probability is the most important
channel to explain the welfare change, and the one which most affects the marriage market.
The bargaining channel is also essential due to its impact on the labor market. It also
makes marriage more attractive to females. The better husband channel, which affects
the labor choice through the income effect, only plays a marginal role.
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2.A Proof of Lemma 2.1
To prove that the two questions defined in (2.2) and (2.12) are equivalent, I will show
that the first order conditions of the two problems when the solutions are interior are
exactly the same.
The first order conditions of problem (2.2) are given by:
c : c−γ(V Mf − V Sf ) + c−γ(V Mm − V Sm) = λ
`f : −ψ`µf (V Mm − V Sm) = λwfzf
`m : −ψ`µm(V Mf − V Sf ) = λwmzm
B.C. : c = wmzm`m + wfzf`f ,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
Collecting terms to eliminate λ gives:
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−ψ`µf (V Mm − V Sm) = c−γ[(V Mf − V Sf ) + (V Mm − V Sm)]wfzf
−ψ`µm(V Mf − V Sf ) = c−γ[(V Mf − V Sf ) + (V Mm − V Sm)]wmzm
c = wmzm`m + wfzf`f ,
The first order conditions of problem (2.12) are:
c : c−γθ + c−γ(1− θ) = λ
`f : −ψ`µfθ = λwfzf
`m : −ψ`µm(1− θ) = λwmzm
B.C. : c = wmzm`m + wfzf`f ,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier and θ = VMm −V Sm(VMm −V Sm)+(VMf −V Sf ) .
Eliminating λ and replacing θ:
−ψ`µf
V Mm − V Sm
(V Mm − V Sm) + (V Mf − V Sf )
= c−γwfzf
−ψ`µm
V Mf − V Sf
(V Mm − V Sm) + (V Mf − V Sf )
= c−γwmzm
c = wmzm`m + wfzf`f ,
which are the same as the FOCs of problem (2.2).
Therefore, the two problems are equivalent to each other.
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2.B Numerical algorithm
The model is solved numerically in Matlab. The algorithm to solve the structure model
involves a complicated fixed-point problem. The following steps illustrate the algorithm
in detail:
1. Solve for the single household allocations and obtain the indirect utilities of being
single.
2. Initialize the guesses of distributions Sf,0, Sm,0, Mf,0 and Mm,0; value functions V Sf,0,
V Sm,0, V Mf,0 and V Mm,0, continuation values contf and contm for married households
and the initial bargaining weights θ0.
3. Solve married household allocations with bargaining weights θ0 by solving the
problem (2.12).
4. Update indirect utilities UMm and UMf .
5. Then the bargaining weight is updated by:
θ = min{max{ U
M
m + contm − V Sm,0
(UMm + contm − V Sm,0) + (UMf + contf − V Sf,0)
, λ}, 1− λ},
where λ is a small number. This guarantees that the weight is between 0 and 1.
6. Update the value functions of being married given the indirect utilities.
7. Given the updated value functions, determine marriage decisions and divorce deci-
sions by comparing value functions of singles and married as equations (2.4) and
(2.7).
8. Update meeting probabilities given distributions.
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9. Given marriage and divorce decisions and meeting probabilities, update continuation
values, value functions, and distributions according to equations (2.5), (2.8), (2.9),
(2.10) and (2.11).
10. Calculate the distances between V Sm and V Sm,0, between V Sf and V Sf,0, between V mm
and V mm,0, between V Mf and V Mf,0 , between Sm and Sm,0, between Sf and Sf,0, between
Mm and Mm,0, and between Mf and Mf,0.
11. Update the guesses of value functions and distributions by a convex combination of
their own values and new values in value function and distribution iterations and
update the bargaining weight θ0 by θ.
12. Check if the distance is small enough. If not, go back to step 3.
Note that the bargaining weight is between 0 and 1. If it reaches the corner, it means
at least one of the spouses rejects the marriage. This is consistent with marriage policy
functions.
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3 The Imbalanced Sex Ratio and
Female Bargaining Power:
Evidence from China
3.1 Introduction
The sex ratio, which is defined by the number of males per 100 females, is considered
to be one of the most important factors in determining the relative bargaining power
between husbands and wives. Becker (1973, 1974) first established the theory that the sex
ratio affects the marriage market through supply and demand, which further influences
the distribution of the marital surplus. Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) develop a
collective framework, and the sex ratio is one of the distribution factors that affect the
intra-household bargaining position. In Chapter 2, I use a Nash bargaining model to
investigate the impact of the imbalanced sex ratio in China on female and male welfare
through labor and marriage market outcomes. While previous studies mainly explore
how the sex ratio affects intra-household bargaining in theory, limited evidence is found
on its direct effect on the bargaining power. Instead, they investigate the sex ratio
effect on intra-household allocations as an indirect measure of the bargaining power.
Therefore, the goal of this study is to empirically investigate how the sex ratio affects the
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relative bargaining power and hence intra-household allocations, and to test the empirical
implications of the model in Chapter 2. The underlying research questions are: How
does the imbalanced sex ratio affect married female bargaining power? How does the
imbalanced sex ratio affect female and male marriage market and labor market outcomes
differently? And how does the imbalanced sex ratio affect intra-household allocations?
In this chapter, I use county-level variations in sex ratios in China to study its impact
on marriage market outcomes, female bargaining power, and intra-household allocations.
The mechanism is that the imbalanced sex ratio affects the marriage market directly, and
therefore improves the outside option of women, which in turn increases her bargaining
power. The change of relative bargaining power further alters intra-household allocations.
When there are more men available in the marriage market, it is easier for women to
find a partner. Since marriage is beneficial due to economies of scale, women obtain a
better outside option, which leads to a higher female bargaining power. With a higher
bargaining power, women can enjoy a larger share of the marital surplus. For instance,
married women can enjoy more leisure by working less both in the market and at home
and allocate more resources to themselves and their children. A more detailed explanation
can be found in Chapter 2.
I focus on China because since the implementation of the One Child Policy in 1980,
there have been an excessive number of men relative to women.1 In the late 2000s, over
120 boys were born for every 100 girls. The county-level variations of the sex ratio are
even larger, which ranged from 0.57 to 1.9 in 2000.
To conduct the analysis, I merge sex ratios obtained from the 1990 and 2000 Chinese
Census data with the 1989, 1991, 1993 and 2000 China Health and Nutrition Survey
(CHNS) data at the county level. The Census data contain individual demographic
1Li, Yi, and Zhang (2011) and Bulte, Heerink, and Zhang (2011) find that 50% to 90% of the imbalanced
sex ratio can be explained by the implementation of the One Child Policy in China. The traditional
son preference and the availability of selective abortion technology increases the sex ratio constantly
(Chu (2001), Yi et al. (1993)).
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information and labor force participation status. Individual demographic information,
time use, decision power in major household purchases, and individual health status are
reported in the CHNS data sets. I use the 2000 Census county-level data to test the sex
ratio effect on female and male marriage and divorce decisions as well as married female
labor force participation decisions. Then the individual level data from the merged data
set are used to test the sex ratio effect on female decision power and intra-household
allocations. The decision power is captured by whether the individual is involved in major
household purchases. Intra-household allocations are measured by the time spent on
household chores, female health status, children’s health, as well as male cigarette and
alcohol consumption.
The identification strategy is based on cross-county variations of sex ratios.2 Overall, I
have 938 counties in the 1990 Census, 2870 counties in the 2000 Census and 75 counties
in the merged data set. In China, most policies are implemented at the provincial level.
Therefore, the province fixed effect is included in all county-level analyses to control for
the provincial government’s policy impact on economic development, which affects the
marriage and labor market directly. Besides the province fixed effect, to avoid selection
biases, I also include many county-level and individual level controls in the regressions.
Some of the controls are measures of local economic development, such as population size,
literacy rate, tap water access rate, whether the individual lives in a rural/urban area,
and educational level. In addition, some aim to control for factors that affect sex ratios,
including the migration rate at the county level, the migration status at the individual
level, and the share of minorities in the county who are not influenced by the One Child
Policy.
2Ideally, a difference-in-difference method across county and year will improve the identification. However,
the CHNS data is a repeated cross-sectional survey, which means the surveyed individuals vary across
years. Therefore, only county-level analysis can be conducted in the merged data, which leaves only
75 observations available. Consequently, the results obtained by the difference-in-difference method
are insignificant. The cross-sectional variation is the best identification strategy I can get from the
data sets.
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I document clear evidence that the higher sex ratio is associated with a higher fraction of
women ever married and a lower fraction of men ever married. Measured by the decision
power in purchasing household goods, married female bargaining power significantly
increases with the sex ratio. The higher sex ratio is also negatively correlated with
married female labor force participation rate. Moreover, wives reduce their housework
hours relative to their husbands, which suggests that married women increase their leisure
time due to her increased bargaining power. Married women and their children are also
healthier in counties with a higher sex ratio. All results are robust to adding control
variables. The results are consistent with model predictions in Chapter 2.
This study contributes to the empirical literature about sex ratios and intra-household
bargaining and provides empirical evidence to support quantitative model predictions. As
discussed earlier, previous studies about the sex ratio effect on intra-household allocations
concentrate on theoretical models (Becker (1973, 1974) and Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix
(2002)). Based on different model setups, they prove that the sex ratio can affect intra-
household allocations by changing the marriage market. Several empirical studies focus
on this perspective and document that the higher sex ratio can lead to a higher likelihood
of marriage for females. Abramitzky, Delavande, and Vasconcelos (2011) use WWI as
an exogenous mortality shock to male population in France. The authors document a
significant increase in the likelihood of marriage for males including a greater likelihood of
them marrying women of higher social classes. Similar results are found for the U.S. and
China by Angrist (2002) and Porter (2016). Their studies show that the marriage rate of
the scarcer females increases with the sex ratio. I test the marriage market implication in
China with the Census data at the county level, which is more representative than the
CHNS data used by Porter (2016).
Other empirical studies investigate the sex ratio effect on the relative bargaining power.
However, due to the lack of a direct measure of the unobserved bargaining power in
the data, studies identify the bargaining power indirectly by exploring intra-household
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allocations. Angrist (2002), Grosjean and Khattar (2018) and Edlund et al. (2013) argue
that the higher sex ratio lowers the female labor force participation rate in the U.S.,
Australia, and China. The reason for this lowering of female labor force participation
is because female bargaining power increases with the sex ratio. Wei and Zhang (2011)
find that the higher sex ratio contributes to the higher savings rate in China. Due to
the higher female bargaining power in the marriage, men save more before marriage to
gain a better bargaining position, which pushes the saving rate up. In a closely related
paper, Edlund et al. (2013) examine the imbalanced sex ratio effect on crime rates, female
labor market outcomes, and intra-household bargaining. They use the CHNS and income
survey data at the provincial level and measure the bargaining power directly by spouse’s
involvement in the decision making of purchasing household TVs, radios, and electric fans.
I use Census data instead, which is more representative, and further extend the measure
of the bargaining power by the decision making of purchases with a much richer basket of
household goods. I also provide different indirect measures of the bargaining power with
intra-household allocations as a compliment.
Limited quantitative studies have been conducted to analyze the sex ratio effects.
Knowles and Vandenbroucke (2015) and Rıos-Rull, Seitz, and Tanaka (2013) focus on the
marriage market outcomes. In Chapter 2, I incorporate a Nash bargaining framework
into the matching model of the marriage market to study the effect of the imbalanced sex
ratio on female labor supply and marriage decisions in China. I find that the higher sex
ratio reduces female labor supply and increases the fraction of females that are married.
This chapter empirically tests these model predictions, and results are indeed consistent
with all predictions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the data.
Section 3.3 presents the estimation models and the results. Section 3.4 concludes.
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3.2 Data description
The data sets used in the analysis are the 1% samples from the 1990 and 2000 Chinese
Censuses and 1989, 1991, 1993 and 2000 China Health and Nutrition Surveys (CHNS).
The Census data contain demographic information about individual age, gender, marital
status, ethnicity, region of residence, living conditions, and labor force participation status.
Therefore, they provide the most precise measure of county-level sex ratios. Overall, there
were 938 counties in the 1990 Census, and 2870 counties in the 2000 Census.
The CHNS are repeated panels collected in nine provinces in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1998,
2000, 2004, 2006 and 2011.3 The nine provinces are Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Shandong,
Jiangsu, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guizhou, and Guangxi, covering regions with different
income levels. In each province, 4 to 16 counties are randomly selected, and in every
survey year over 11, 000 individuals participated in the survey.4 Individual educational
level, health status, time use, and expenditures are reported in the CHNS data sets. For
this reason, they are more suitable for studying intra-household allocations. However,
due to the sampling method of a multistage random cluster process, it is problematic
to use the sex ratio calculated from the CHNS. Instead, I merge the CHNS data with
sex ratios calculated from the Censuses at the county level to conduct the analysis of
intra-household allocations.5
To study the sex ratio effect on labor and marriage market outcomes and intra-household
allocations, I restrict the population age range to be between 18 and 50 years old. I
choose this age range for two reasons. Firstly, the official female retirement age in China
is between 50 and 55. Secondly, over 93% of the population are currently married by the
3The surveys are conducted by the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety, China Center for
Disease Control and Prevention, Carolina Population Center, the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, and the Fogarty International Center.
4Detailed description of the data set can be found at http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china/
about/proj_desc/survey.
5After matching all counties with their Census counterpart, I have in total 75 counties in 8 provinces.
The province of Heilongjiang is excluded because I cannot match the county identifiers with the
Census.
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age of 50, and this number starts to fall for older cohorts due to mortality. Therefore, I
restrict the population of interest to be under 50 years old.
Table 3.1 presents all variables used in the analysis, and Table 3.2 provides detailed
information of data sources.
1. Sex ratios: The county-level sex ratios are measured by resident sex ratios, which
is calculated by the number of males over the number of females living in the
county. However, many studies are concerned about within-country migration. This
affects not only the resident sex ratios but also the local labor and marriage market
(Edlund (2005), Porter (2016)), which leads to a selection bias. People may migrate
to more developed areas to secure better job opportunities or for marriage purposes.
However, this is not a major concern in this study. As the resident population
constitutes the local labor market, the resident sex ratio can explain changes in the
labor market. In addition, according to the 2000 Census, migration for marriage
only accounts for less than 1% of the total number of migrants, for which reason the
impact of migration on the marriage market is limited. As a robustness check, I also
control for the migration status of each individual throughout my entire analysis. It
can be concluded that the resident sex ratio is the suitable measure in this study.
In 1990, the average sex ratio was 1.047, with a standard deviation of 0.0785. The
value ranged from 0.7142 to 1.6909. In 2000, the mean increased to 1.06, and the
variations among counties also became larger. The 2000 sex ratio is used to analyze
the marriage market, labor market, female health and children’s health outcomes,
whereas the 1990 sex ratio is used in female home production and relative bargaining
power analysis.
2. Female labor force participation: The female labor force participation rates are
calculated at the county level for the year 2000. Overall, the female labor force
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participation rates were very high at an average of 83%. The variations were also
substantial, ranging from 34% to full participation.
3. Marriage market behaviors: Variables that capture the marriage market are the
fraction of females/males that are married, the fraction of females/males that are
single, and the divorced counterparts. In 2000, among all counties, around 80% of
the population was married, 19% had never been married, and only about 1% of
the population was divorced.
4. Intra-household bargaining:
• Decision power: In the CHNS expenditure survey, married individuals are
asked: “Do you participate in buying decisions of...?” and “Who is the decision
maker in buying...?” Thus, the answers to these questions can capture the
relative bargaining power within the household. The goods basket includes
radios, stereos, VCRs, TVs, washing machines, fridges, air conditioners, sewing
machines, electric fans, and cameras. I calculate the probability of participating
and the probability of making decisions in purchasing the goods basket as the
measure of the bargaining power. Since these questions were only asked in the
first three waves in the CHNS, I calculate the measure from the 1989, 1991
and 1993 CHNS asset surveys. As shown in Table 3.1, statistics suggest that
most wives were involved in purchase decisions, but most final decisions were
made by husbands.
• Female and male home production hours: Home production hours are obtained
from the 1989, 1991 and 1993 CHNS time use surveys. Home production hours
consist of time used in buying food, preparing food, washing clothes, cleaning
the house, taking care of parents, and child care for married households. Since
there were a large number of missing values in the time use surveys after 1993,
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I only utilize the first three waves. Overall, wives spent about 2 hours more
than husbands in home production per day.
• Female and male health: The CHNS provide information for adults about their
self-reported health status. The scale ranges from 1 to 4, where 4 stands for
“excellent” while 1 means “poor”. On average, female health status is between
“fair” and “good”, but slightly worse than men’s health.
• Children’s health: As a measure of children’s health, the CHNS also reports
whether the child aged 6 to 18 is over-weight or not. It takes the value of 1
if the child is over-weight and 0 if he/she is normal. In 2000, about 7% of
children were over-weight.
• Female and male cigarette consumption: Conditional on smoking, the number
of cigarettes smoked per day is reported at the individual level in the CHNS
physical examination surveys. On average, in 2000, male smokers consumed
over 17 cigarettes per day, while women smoked about 3 cigarettes less than
men per day. Note that as reported in Table 3.2, there are only 74 observations
in the female sample, compared to over 4000 observations in the male sample.
• Female and male beer consumption: The CHNS physical examination surveys
report how many bottles of beer an individual drinks per week, conditional on
drinking beer. The average male weekly beer consumption was 3.7 bottles per
week in 2000 with women drinking an average of 2.2 bottles. But again, the
sample size of women is also much smaller than that of men.
5. Other controls: Additional control variables at the county level comprises of economic
controls and sex ratio controls. The economic controls include the population size,
literacy rate, and tap water access rate. These controls are intended to capture
regional economic development, which may affect the resident sex ratio, marriage,
and the labor market. The sex ratio controls are the share of migrants and the share
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of minorities. The former controls for the impact of migration on the local sex ratio,
and the latter controls for the population who are not under the restriction of the
One Child Policy. Individual level controls include years of education completed,
age, and whether the individual lives in a rural area or urban area.
3.3 Results
First of all, the imbalanced sex ratio affects the marriage market. The marriage market
condition then changes the relative bargaining position within the household, where
women benefit from the scarcity. As a result, the higher female bargaining power changes
intra-household allocations. Therefore, the first step of the analysis is to test the sex ratio
effect on marriage market outcomes.
3.3.1 Sex ratios and marriage market outcomes
To study the sex ratio effect on intra-household allocations, I first investigate how the
imbalanced sex ratio may affect marriage market outcomes, which have a further impact
on outside options for females. I use the 2000 Census data aggregated at the county
level to conduct the estimation. The results are derived from estimating the following
regression form:
yi = β0 + β1ln(sri) + β2Xi + δi + i (3.1)
where yi is the outcome of interest, which includes the fraction of females/males that
are currently married, divorced, or have never been married for county i. sri is the
corresponding sex ratio, defined by the number of males over the number of females aged
between 18 and 50. Xi is a vector of county-specific controls, including the population
share of minorities, the literacy rate, the fraction of households having access to tap water,
and the migration rate. δi is a vector of province dummies to control for province fixed
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sex ratio
Sex ratio (1990) 1.047 0.0785 0.7142 1.6909
Sex ratio (2000) 1.0603 0.1941 0.5758 1.8902
Marriage market
Married fraction, female 0.8298 0.0662 0.2783 0.9382
Married fraction, male 0.7462 0.0580 0.4168 0.8790
Single fraction, female 0.1610 0.0615 0.0566 0.7198
Single fraction, male 0.2410 0.0577 0.1111 0.5705
Divorced fraction, female 0.0092 0.0108 0.0004 0.1392
Divorced fraction, female 0.0128 0.0068 0.0018 0.0688
Labor market
Female Labor Force Participation 0.8302 0.1236 0.3403 1
Female home hours 4.532 1.619 0 9.143
Male home hours 2.568 0.918 0 6.381
Intra-household allocations
Major purchase (participation) 0.8166 0.3110 0 1
Major purchase (decision) 0.1953 0.3155 0 1
Female health 2.5914 0.7469 1 4
Male health 2.8168 0.7286 1 4
Children’s health 0.0709 0.3224 0 1
Female cigarette consumption 14.31 7.8 0 30
Male cigarette consumption 16.91 8.94 0 60
Female beer consumption 2.24 2.13 1 14
Male beer consumption 3.67 4.3 1 74
County level controls
Population Size (1990) 28509 24149 215 79478
Population Size (2000) 31900 27558 384 93625
Literacy rate 0.8852 0.1119 0.1378 0.9945
Minority rate 0.1615 0.2897 0 0.9978
Migration rate 0.1146 0.1164 0.0015 0.9204
Tap water access rate 0.4662 0.3152 0 1
Individual level controls
Education (years, 1990) 7.348 3.765 0 18
Rural (1990) 0.6740 0.4688 0 1
Education (years, 2000) 10.41 4.222 0 18
Rural (2000) 0.6750 0.4684 0 1
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Table 3.2: Data sources
Variable Observations Source
Sex ratio (1990) 938 1990 Chinese Census, 1% sample
Sex ratio (2000) 2870 2000 Chinese Census, 1% sample
Married fraction, female 2870 2000 Chinese Census, 1% sample
Married fraction, male 2870 2000 Chinese Census, 1% sample
Single fraction, female 2870 2000 Chinese Census, 1% sample
Single fraction, male 2870 2000 Chinese Census, 1% sample
Divorced fraction, female 2870 2000 Chinese Census, 1% sample
Divorced fraction, female 2870 2000 Chinese Census, 1% sample
Female Labor Force Participation 2870 2000 Chinese Census, 1% sample
Female home hours 2384 1989, 1991 and 1993 CHNS time use survey
Male home hours 2022 1989, 1991 and 1993 CHNS time use survey
Major purchase (participation) 4484 1989, 1991 and 1993 CHNS asset survey
Major purchase (decision) 4484 1989, 1991 and 1993 CHNS asset survey
Female health 957 2000 CHNS physical examination survey
Male health 5845 2000 CHNS physical examination survey
Children’s health 2211 2000 CHNS media use survey
Female cigarette consumption 74 2000 CHNS physical examination survey
Male cigarette consumption 4076 2000 CHNS physical examination survey
Female beer consumption 308 2000 CHNS physical examination survey
Male beer consumption 2908 2000 CHNS physical examination survey
Population Size (1990) 938 1990 Chinese Census, 1% sample
Population Size (2000) 2870 2000 Chinese Census, 1% sample
Literacy rate 2870 2000 Chinese Census, 1% sample
Minority rate 2870 2000 Chinese Census, 1% sample
Migration rate 2870 2000 Chinese Census, 1% sample
Tap water access rate 2870 2000 Chinese Census, 1% sample
Education (years, 1990) 4484 1989, 1991 and 1993 CHNS education survey
Rural (1990) 4484 1989, 1991 and 1993 CHNS education survey
Education (years, 2000) 6844 2000 CHNS education survey
Rural (2000) 6898 2000 CHNS education survey
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effect.6 β1 is the parameter of interest, and I take the log form of the sex ratios in all
analyses such that the results can be directly interpreted as percentage changes.
Given that more males are available in the marriage market, the fraction of females
that are currently married should increase, and the fraction of females that have never
been married should fall. The opposite should happen to men. Results are illustrated in
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 for women and men respectively.
Columns (1) and (4) in Table 3.3 suggest that the fraction of females that are currently
married is positively correlated with the sex ratio. A 1% increase in the sex ratio is
associated with about a 0.1 percentage point higher fraction of females that are married.
On the other hand, as illustrated in columns (2) and (5), the fraction of females that have
never been married is negatively correlated with the sex ratio. Consequently, a higher
sex ratio does indeed make it easier for women to find a husband. There is no significant
effect of the sex ratio on the divorce rate. Table 3.4 shows that the results reverse for
men, as they are less likely to find a wife. The additional county-specific controls slightly
reduce the estimated effects but do not change the results qualitatively.
3.3.2 Sex ratios and female labor market outcomes
In this study, I investigate the sex ratio effect on female labor supply at the extensive
margin.7 All variables are aggregated at the county level. The following regression is used
to estimate the sex ratio effect:
yi = β0 + β1ln(sri) + β2Xi + δi + i (3.2)
6Province fixed effect is included, as provinces are very unequally developed in China. In addition,
provincial level policies may affect outcome variables differently.
7The census data only report labor supply at the extensive margin. The CHNS time use questionnaires
ask about individual working hours but only in the 1989 wave, and the answer rate to this question
was very low. Using this sample results in less than 100 observations. Therefore, in this study I focus
on the extensive margin.
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where yi is the female labor force participation rate in county i. sri defines the county-level
sex ratio. The controls are the same as in the previous analysis, where Xi is the vector of
county specific controls, and δi is the vector of province dummies. β1 is the parameter of
interest in the estimation.
Table 3.5: Sex ratios and female labor force participation, county-level, 2000 Census.
OLS.
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Sex ratio) -0.159∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗
(0.0619) (0.0568) (0.0370)
Controls
Minority rate 0.0173 0.0278
(0.0183) (0.0194)
Literacy rate 0.00342 -0.0387
(0.0384) (0.0392)
Access to tap water -0.0738∗∗∗ -0.0685∗∗∗
(0.0214) (0.0215)
Migration rate -0.541∗∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗
(0.0764) (0.0986)
Fraction of females, married -0.078∗∗
(0.0238)
Province fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2870 2870 2870
Adjusted R2 0.381 0.513 0.522
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: 2000 Census, at the county level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.5 present the results with or without county-specific
controls. The female labor force participation rate falls when the sex ratio grows. Specifi-
cally, a 1% increase in the sex ratio correlates with about a 0.16 percentage point decrease
in the female labor force participation rate. The effect is stronger when additional county
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specific-controls are included. Overall, the estimated magnitude is similar to studies in
other countries. Angrist (2002) finds that a 1% increase in the sex ratio of the second gen-
eration of immigrants reduces married female labor force participation by a 0.1 percentage
point. A larger effect is found in Australia by Grosjean and Khattar (2018), where a 1%
increase in the historical sex ratio is associated with a 0.3 percentage point reduction in
female labor force participation.
Two reasons explain the drop in female labor force participation: First, the higher
female bargaining power enables wives to take a larger share of the marital surplus by
enjoying more leisure. Therefore, they will reduce their labor supply in the market. At
the extreme, they will drop out of the labor force. Second, there is a compositional effect
of an increased share of the married female population. On average, married women are
more likely than singles to stay at home either for home production or to enjoy leisure
time. When there are more females getting married, total female labor supply falls. To
identify the bargaining channel effect, I control for the fraction of females that are married
in each county on top of the other controls. Column (3) in Table 3.5 illustrates the result.
Compared with the estimated result in column (2), the sex ratio effect is smaller if the
fraction of females that are married is a control variable, suggesting that both channels
contribute to the negative impact of the sex ratio on female labor force participation. The
difference indicates that the change of female bargaining power plays a more important
role in explaining the sex ratio effect than the compositional change of the married female
population.
One may be concerned that in the high sex ratio counties, female labor supply is lower
because women spend more time on home production rather than on leisure. If this is
the case, we can observe that in the high sex ratio counties, female labor supply drops,
and at the same time her home production hours increase, while her bargaining power
is not affected. Therefore, in the next subsection, I will test if female bargaining power
increases with the sex ratio and more importantly, if female home production time falls
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with the sex ratio.
3.3.3 Sex ratios and bargaining power
The sex ratio effects on marriage market outcomes suggest that females have a better
outside option when the sex ratio increases. Therefore, female bargaining power rises.
Most empirical studies estimate the relative bargaining power indirectly by exploring
intra-household allocations, with a particular focus on private consumption goods. The
CHNS data sets provide many indirect measures, but more importantly, questions related
to a direct measure of the bargaining power are also asked in the asset surveys. For
instance, individuals are asked whether he/she is involved in decision making and whether
he/she is the decision maker in major household purchases. Therefore, following the idea
proposed by Edlund et al. (2013), I calculate the probability of an individual participating
in decision making, and the probability that he/she is the decision maker. However,
different from Edlund et al. (2013), who only consider electric fans, TVs, and radios, which
only takes a small share of home durable purchase into account, I extend home durable
goods to all goods covered in the survey by adding stereos, VCRs washing machines,
fridges, air conditioners, sewing machines, and cameras. Thus, my measure of relative
bargaining power contains more information. Another difference is that I use cross-county
variations instead of cross-province variation as the identification strategy. By doing so, I
have 75 counties each year instead of only 8 provincial level variations.8
This analysis uses the 1989, 1991 and 1993 waves of CHNS asset surveys. Since the
CHNS is a repeated cross-sectional survey, I simply pool the three waves data together.
8The official CHNS data sets report the eight province names, which can be matched directly to the
Census data. However, the CHNS data sets only provide city and county identifiers not their names.
Furthermore, the identifiers are not the same as those in the Census. That is probably the reason why
Edlund et al. (2013) only use the data at the provincial level. I managed to obtain all county names
matched with the identifiers from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, which is in
charge of conducting the CHNS. Consequently, I am able to match the CHNS with the Census data
by county names.
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Therefore, the sex ratio is recalculated at the county level from the 1990 Census as an
approximation. The sample is further restricted to married individuals. In addition,
different from the Census, urban population in the CHNS data is over-sampled, which
accounts for more than half of the sample size. Consequently, the residential area
(rural/urban) of an individual is added as a control variable in the analysis.
The following regression model is estimated:
yij = β0 + β1ln(srj) + β2femalei + β3femalei × ln(srj) + β4Xij + ij (3.3)
where yij is the outcome of interest of individual i in county j, including the probability of
participating in decision making and the probability of being the decision maker in major
household purchases. It takes values between 0 and 1, where 0 means that the individual
does not participate in the decision-making process or the individual is not the decision
maker when purchasing home goods. 1 stands for the case that the individual participates
in all decision making or he/she is the decision maker for all home goods purchases. srj
represents the county-level sex ratio. femalei is the indicator function of whether the
individual is female or not. Xij is a vector of county-level and individual-level controls,
which are the population size of the county (in log), individual educational level in years,
and whether the individual lives in the rural area or not. β3 is the estimated parameter
of interest. It represents how the gender gap of the outcome varies with the sex ratio.
Table 3.6 reports the results. As expected, female bargaining power increases with
the sex ratio. A 1% increase in the sex ratio will make wives 0.1 percentage points
more likely to be involved in decision making and 0.16 percentage points more likely to
become the decision maker relative to husbands. The amounts are much smaller than
in the analysis of Edlund et al. (2013), where the estimated numbers are 0.16 and 0.21
respectively. Moreover, captured by the coefficients of “female”, wives have on average
a lower bargaining power than husbands. With county-specific and individual-specific
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controls, the sex ratio effect on females participating in decision making is slightly lower,
but the estimated value of females being the decision maker becomes more significant.
Table 3.6: Sex ratios and the decision power. OLS.
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Participate Decision maker Participate Decision maker
Female× ln(Sex ratio) 0.105∗∗ 0.164∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.166∗∗
(0.0329) (0.0709) (0.0350) (0.0693)
Female -0.348∗∗∗ -0.394∗∗∗ -0.323∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗
(0.0721) (0.0817) (0.0694) (0.0781)
ln(Sex ratio) -0.0764∗ -0.140∗∗ -0.153∗∗ -0.0779
(0.0368) (0.0498) (0.0445) (0.0665)
Controls
ln(population size) 0.000679 0.0859∗
(0.0563) (0.0368)
Education (years) 0.00748∗∗∗ -0.000883
(0.00201) (0.00167)
Rural -0.0430∗ 0.0379∗
(0.0202) (0.0181)
Observations 4484 4484 4483 4483
Adjusted R2 0.088 0.126 0.1 0.128
Standard errors in parentheses
Data source: 1989, 1991, 1993 CHNS and 1990 Census
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.3.4 Sex ratios and intra-household allocations
With a higher bargaining power, females are able to gain a larger share of the marital
surplus. The following variables are the relevant measures of the intra-household allocation
outcomes: wives’ home production time, the health status of wives, children’s health, and
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the amount of individual tobacco and beer consumption.9 While I use the 1990 sex ratio
and 1989, 1991 and 1993 CHNS data to estimate the effect on female home production
time, the estimations of female health, children’s health measured by obesity and tobacco
and beer consumption are based on the 2000 sex ratio and 2000 CHNS data.
The regression strategies of female home production and female health status are the
same as equation (3.3), which answers: For those who live in the high sex ratio area, how
much can a wife reduce her home production time and to what extent can she improve
her health compared to a husband?
The sex ratio effect on children’s obesity is estimated by the following regression:
yij = β0 + β1ln(srj) + β2Xij + ij (3.4)
where yij is the indicator of over-weight of child i in county j. It takes the value of 0 and
1, where 0 stands for normal weight and 1 for over-weight. srj represents the county-level
sex ratio. Xij is a vector of county-level and individual level controls, which are the
population size of the county (in log), the age of the child, and whether the child lives in
the rural area or not. β1 is the estimator of interest.
As cigarettes and beer are mainly consumed by men in China, I restrict the sample to
the male population, and modify the regression function (3.3) to estimate the sex ratio
effect:
yij = β0 + β1ln(srj) + β2Xij + ij (3.5)
where yij captures how many cigarettes the male smokes per day, and how many bottles
of beer he drinks per week. The controls are the same as equation (3.3).
Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 report the results of the sex ratio effect on intra-household
allocations.
9As discussed in Section 3.2, less than 10% of beer and 2% of tobacco are consumed by women. Therefore,
the measure is mainly male tobacco and beer consumption.
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Table 3.8: Sex ratios and intra-household allocations II. OLS.
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cigarette Beer Cigarette Beer
ln(Sex ratio) 4.284 -4.414 3.133 -4.448∗
(5.922) (2.821) (6.133) (2.215)
Controls
ln(population size) -0.172 -0.137
(0.434) (0.453)
Education (years) -0.364∗ 0.246
(0.167) (0.171)
Rural 0.688 0.350
(0.736) (0.408)
Observations 4076 2908 4055 2903
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.009
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: 2000 China Health and Nutrition Survey
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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The effects of an increased sex ratio on home production time are presented in Columns
(1) and (4) of Table 3.7. Home production time is defined by the sum of hours spent on
buying food, preparing food, washing cloth, cleaning the house, taking care of parents,
and child care per day. The results indicate that the gap of home production hours
between the husband and wife falls by 1.9 hours per day if the sex ratio increases by 1%.
In addition, the coefficients of “female” suggest that wives, on average, spend about 4
hours more than husbands in home production. The additional controls barely change
the estimated outcome.
If the sex ratio increases, while wives reduce their time spent on household chores,
husbands need to increase their home production time. This change in the division of
tasks reduces the gender gap in home production. The finding is consistent with the
theory of intra-household bargaining. If women have a higher bargaining power, they can
enjoy more leisure rather than working more, both in the market and at home. Ideally,
I would like to directly measure the impact of the sex ratio on married female leisure
enjoyment. But the labor supply data at the intensive margin is only available in the
1989 CHNS, and the response rate to this question was too low. Only less than 100 wives
provided their working hours information, which leads to an insignificant regression result.
Columns (2) and (5) show the sex ratio effect on female health status, which is measured
by a self-reported health scale from 1 to 4 with 1 being “excellent”. When women obtain a
higher bargaining power, they are able to keep more household resources to improve their
health. This expectation is supported by the empirical result. Relative to the husband,
the health status of the wife increases by almost one scale if the sex ratio increases by 10
percentage points. Given that females have, on average, a 10% worse health status than
males (see Table 3.2), the imbalanced sex ratio significantly improves female health. By
adding controls, the sex ratio effect becomes stronger.
A further implication of the higher female bargaining power is its impact on children.
Empirical studies suggest that a higher female bargaining power is associated with more
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resources allocated to children, such as food, clothing, and children’s educational outcomes
(Handa (1996), Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997), Attanasio and Lechene (2002),
Basu (2006)). Analogously, if female bargaining power increases, children’s health should
improve. The CHNS media use surveys provide a measure of whether a child is over-weight
or not. The estimated outcomes in columns (3) and (6) imply that children are about 14%
less likely to be obese when the sex ratio increases by 1%. When there are controls in the
regression, the result is insignificant. However, once controls are added, it is significant
at the 0.05 confidence level. The reason for this difference is the introduction of the age
control. Older children are more likely to be over-weight. Once I control for children’s
age, the sex ratio plays a more important role. The finding is consistent with Porter
(2016), who shows that a higher sex ratio improves children’s Z-scores in China, which is
a measure of children’s short-term nutritional health.
The higher female bargaining power, on the other hand, will reduce the household
resources allocated to the husband. Therefore, I further investigate whether the higher
sex ratio is associated with lower consumption in two male-dominated goods, namely
cigarettes and beer. Table 3.8 presents the estimated results. According to columns (1)
and (3), there is a positive but insignificant effect of the sex ratio on husbands’ tobacco
consumption. The results seem to contradict the bargaining theory which suggests that
husbands with a lower bargaining power should reduce their private consumption. In
addition, if wives care about the health of their husbands, the amount of smoking should
be even lower. One possible explanation is that for families with sons, the head of the
household (typically the husband), is under much higher pressure as soon as the boy
approaches marriageable age due to the marriage market competition. To cope with the
pressure, the husband significantly increases his cigarette consumption (Chen (2018)),
which counteracts the lower bargaining power effect and makes the result insignificant. As
regards alcohol consumption, which is reported in columns (2) and (4), the coefficients on
beer consumption is negative, suggesting that husbands have lower alcohol consumption
69
3 The Imbalanced Sex Ratio and Female Bargaining Power: Evidence from China
in high sex ratio regions. The result is significant at the 0.1 confidence level if all controls
are included. As male bargaining power is lower in high sex ratio counties, his alcohol
consumption falls.
3.4 Conclusion
The sex ratio in China has grown significantly during the last 30 years. How does the
imbalanced sex ratio affect intra-household bargaining and allocations? In this chapter, I
investigate this problem empirically and test the model implications proposed in Chapter
2. I use county-level variations in sex ratios to study its impact on marriage market
outcomes, female labor supply, intra-household allocations and female bargaining power.
Merging the county-level sex ratios calculated from the Census data with the China
Health and Nutrition Survey data, I find that females are more likely to find a husband
while males are more likely to stay single. The higher sex ratio is also associated with a
higher female bargaining power. With a higher bargaining power, females are able to keep
a larger share of the marital surplus. They reduce both the market working hours and
the time spent on household chores, which means that they can enjoy more leisure. The
higher bargaining power also enables females to improve both their health and that of
their children. The results are robust to migration status, educational level, and regional
economic development controls.
While policy makers worry about the “missing women” causing gender imbalance and
hurting women in China, my findings suggest that the imbalanced sex ratio actually
benefits those women who are born and makes them better off. In the long run, when sex
ratio returns to its natural level, policy makers should keep in mind that female bargaining
power will also react to the demographic change.
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4 Female Bargaining Power and
Labor Supply: A Study of
Eliminating Joint Taxation
4.1 Introduction
The U.S. federal income tax based on the family unit has been controversial in policy
debates for years. Implemented in 1948, the family-based taxation system differentiates
between single and married households.1 Married households pay taxes based on the
sum of two spouses’ income, which implies that the marginal tax rate for both spouses is
the same, regardless of the individual income level. Since the husband is typically the
primary earner in the household, the joint tax scheme generates a higher marginal tax
rate for the wife. The higher marginal tax rate distorts the wife’s incentive to work, and
the greater the income gap the more this distortion becomes. Such distortion is one of
the major concerns of policy makers. Therefore, the Congressional Budget Office (1997)
and the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform in 20052 have proposed a tax
reform regarding individual taxation. They believe that reducing the marginal tax rate
1Table A1 in Appendix 4.A shows the tax brackets and tax rates of the 2018 U.S. income taxation
schedule for single and married households.
2See Dalsgaard (2005) and United States Congressional Budget Office (1997) for a summary of the
proposals on tax reforms. The full proposal can be found at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
taxreformpanel/final-report/index.html.
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for married females would increase their labor supply and improve gender equality.3
This argument is supported by both empirical and quantitative studies. Many empirical
studies find that the elasticity of labor supply differs by gender and marital status (e.g.,
Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1998), Heim (2007), Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2014)
and Doepke and Tertilt (2016)), where the elasticity of female labor, especially married
female labor is higher than that of male labor (Triest (1990), Eissa (1995) and Keane
(2011)). Their results suggest that the tax reform could significantly affect married female
labor supply. Quantitative studies estimate that female labor would increase by about
10% after eliminating joint taxation. Taking marriage decisions into consideration, Chade
and Ventura (2002) study the effect of tax reforms on married female labor supply and find
a maximum increase of 10.1%. Bick and Fuchs-Schündeln (2017) present a quantitative
model of taxes and female labor supply across countries, and they estimate the married
female labor supply to be around 8% higher under the individual tax scheme in the
U.S. Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2011) provide the highest estimate among these
quantitative works. Considering life-cycle components, including fertility, human capital
and wage profile, they solve a general equilibrium model and find that this tax reform
can generate an additional 11.4% married female working hours.
However, all of the existing quantitative studies have one missing component: They
treat a married household as one decision-making unit and ignore the possible decision
interaction within the household. Scholars have stressed the importance of individual
behaviors and the bargaining process in analyzing intra-household allocations such as
female labor supply (Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981), Lundberg
and Pollak (1993)). Consequently, the impact of the tax reform on the intra-household
decision process should be considered in the tax reform analysis.
3Married couples are also allowed to file their tax return separately. However, if they choose separate
filing, their access to tax benefits will be severely limited. According to the IRS data, there are less
than 1% of married households filing separately, and most of them live separately or have unpaid
taxes.
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In this chapter, I investigate the following questions: If female bargaining power is
determined by relative after-tax income, how would the tax reform from joint taxation
to individual taxation affect married female labor supply on the intensive margin? How
would this tax reform change the welfare of the husband and wife? The main contribution
of this study is to incorporate intra-household bargaining into the tax reform problem to
study its effect on married female labor supply, when relative after-tax income directly
affects female bargaining power.
Instead of treating the household as a decision unit, in this study, I assume that the
married couple bargain over their private consumption and labor supply. Therefore,
besides the income and substitution effects discussed in the literature, intra-household
bargaining implies two additional effects. On the one hand, the increased female bargaining
power generates a direct effect. Due to higher relative after-tax income after the tax
reform, the higher bargaining power enables her to enjoy more leisure rather than supply
more labor. On the other hand, an indirect effect occurs as she endogenizes the impact
of her labor supply on her bargaining power. Given that the more she earns, the higher
bargaining power she obtains, she would have the incentive to work even more. Since the
two additional effects drive female labor supply in opposite directions, the total effect of
the tax reform still depends on the magnitude of the income and substitution effects, the
direct effect, and the indirect effect.
To capture the new mechanism, I build a semi-cooperative bargaining model. Husbands
and wives bargain over their private consumption and labor supply through a two-stage
game. Specifically, the husband and wife decide non-cooperatively on their labor supply
in the first stage, then cooperatively on individual consumption in the second stage.
The bargaining power in the cooperative decision problem is a function of the relative
after-tax income of the household. Based on this model, I provide both a qualitative and
a quantitative analysis of the tax reform, by comparing its impact on married female
labor supply in the standard fixed-weight model with the endogenous bargaining model’s
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prediction. In the fixed-weight model, female bargaining power remains constant after
the tax reform, while in the endogenous bargaining model, it is endogenously determined
by relative after-tax income, which further depends on her labor supply decision. The tax
scheme is represented by a tax function that captures the progressivity, tax allowance and
different treatments between single and married households. Therefore, the tax reform is
captured by the change in the tax function for married households, which is a function of
individual labor supply.
Calibrating the models to match the 2003 U.S. married household working hours data,
I find that the tax reform could increase married female labor supply by 1.2% in the
endogenous bargaining model. But in the fixed-weight model, the effect is much larger,
where female working hours increase by 3.5%. Such a difference suggests that the direct
effect dominates the indirect effect, and married females tend to enjoy more leisure given
a higher bargaining power. The welfare implications reverse. When female bargaining
power is endogenous, the wife gains 4.5% in consumption equivalent units, while the
husband loses 0.9%. But she loses 2.3% of consumption and her husband gains 1.2% if
her bargaining weight is fixed. The effect is stronger for non-college educated wives. The
reason is that in the endogenous bargaining scenario, with a higher bargaining power, the
wife is able to keep a larger share of total household income for private consumption and
substitutes less leisure time for work.
This study combines two strands of the economic literature. In addition to the literature
on the tax reform and labor supply discussed above, this study also fits into the family
economics literature about intra-household bargaining. In this vein, Becker and Becker
(2009), Chiappori (1992), Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981) and
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) establish the theoretical framework of intra-household decision
making. Depending on different efficiency assumptions, the collective model and the
cooperative Nash bargaining model assume efficient outcomes. In contrast, the non-
cooperative Nash bargaining and the separate spheres bargaining model assume inefficiency
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or partial efficiency. Empirical studies provide more and more evidence of partial efficiency
in intra-household allocation (Akresh (2005), Ashraf (2009) and Angelucci and Garlick
(2015)). Therefore, I combine a collective model with a non-cooperative Nash bargaining
model to capture the partial efficiency. The gender wage gap, the relative educational level,
and the sex ratio are found to be factors that determine the relative bargaining power
(Mazzocco (2007), Iyigun and Walsh (2007), Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) and
Goldin (2006)). In this study, I assume the after-tax income to be the distribution factor in
intra-household bargaining. This chapter also contributes to quantitative studies that are
built on the bargaining framework. Knowles (2013) uses a cooperative bargaining model
to analyze the change in the U.S. married household labor supply pattern in response
to the reducing gender wage gap. He finds that the bargaining process can explain the
relatively constant female to male leisure ratio over the last 40 years. Siegel (2017) studies
how the narrowing of the gender wage gap in the U.S. can explain the change in fertility
rate if female bargaining power is endogenous. He finds a negative impact of the female
bargaining position on the fertility rate. Voena (2015) uses a non-cooperative model to
study the effect of the change of divorce laws on married household allocations with limited
commitment. This study adopts the idea of intra-household bargaining implemented in
these studies and extends the bargaining specification to a semi-cooperative bargaining
framework.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides empirical evidence
from the literature for the argument that relative after-tax income affects female bargaining
power and allocations. Section 4.3 presents the model setup. Section 4.4 provides a
qualitative analysis of the tax reform effect. Section 4.5 presents the calibration. Section
4.6 discusses the policy experiment and its implications quantitatively. Section 4.7
concludes.
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4.2 Empirical evidence on bargaining and after-tax
income
Since the establishment of the theory of modern family economics by Gary Becker back in
the 1960s, many empirical studies have tried to test various implications of intra-household
decisions. Regardless of their tests of either who makes decisions in the household, or
whether the decision-making process is efficient or not, their results provide empirical
evidence that the relative gross income, and even relative after-tax income, can change
female bargaining power in household decision making. The change in the relative
bargaining position further affects intra-household allocations.
Studies have shown that relative gross income determines intra-household allocations.
Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) use a policy reform in the UK in the late 1970s as a
natural experiment to test the unitary model assumption of income pooling. Before the
reform, the child benefit scheme was granted through a tax allowance, which typically
reduced the husband’s tax liability. After the reform, the tax allowance was replaced by
paying a similar amount of money to the mother, therefore leaving the total household
income unchanged. However, using the Family Expenditure Survey Data, the authors show
that this reform significantly increased the wife’s expenditure on her and her children’s
clothing, while the husband’s clothing consumption decreased. This result indicates that
those who receive the income matter for intra-household allocations.
Similar results are also found in developing countries. Attanasio and Lechene (2002)
test the same assumption of income pooling based on the Progresa program in Mexico,
where the program gave money to women in the poorest families in rural areas. They find
direct evidence that the wife’s decision-making power measured by different indicators, is
positively correlated with her relative income in the family. In addition, the increased
female decision power also enables her to spend more on children’s education, health, and
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household public goods.
While most empirical studies suggest that the relative gross income affects intra-
household allocations, the key assumption of this study is that relative after-tax income
determines the relative bargaining power. To illustrate that the after-tax income may affect
intra-household bargaining, I take the German withholding tax system as an example,
which is a joint taxation scheme similar to the U.S.4 It allows married couples to choose
between a tax class combination of III and V and a combination of IV and IV.5 For a
given income level, the tax rate in class V is the highest, and class III is the lowest. When
the couple choose the combination of class III and class V, it is optimal for the primary
earner (typically the husband) to be in tax class III, which implies a lower marginal tax
rate as if the second earner (the wife) did not earn any labor income. However, a much
higher tax rate is imposed on the second earner in class V. In contrast, if they choose
the tax class combination between IV and IV, each of them pays their withholding tax
individually regardless of the partner’s income.
Consider one simple example under the German withholding tax system. Suppose that
annually the husband earns pre-tax e60, 000, and the wife’s pre-tax income is e20, 000.
If they choose the tax class combination between III and V, their after-withholding-tax
income (or so-called take-home money) amounts to e67, 144. But if they choose the IV
and IV combination, their take-home money reduces to e64, 613. The larger the income
gap between two spouses, the more beneficial it is for the family to choose the combination
that potentially harms the second earner. After the tax filing, the difference between the
real tax liability and the withholding tax will be refunded to the family at the end of the
fiscal year. However, considering the adjustment cost and interest saved over the year, the
family can still benefit from optimally choosing the withholding tax class combination in
4The difference is that the taxable income is defined by the total household income in the U.S., while
Germany uses the average income of the household as the measure. Accordingly, the tax bracket
varies.
5The default setting is the combination of tax class IV and IV, but when both spouses agree, they can
change to III and V. This change can be made only once a year.
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the first place. However, given this benefit, according to a study by Stöwhase (2011) who
analyzes the German withholding tax data, more than 20% of married German households
do not minimize their withholding tax. One possible explanation is that relative after-tax
income directly affects female bargaining power, such that she is willing to temporarily
forgo some income to obtain more equal income and a better bargaining position. Based
on this finding, in this study, I assume that the relative bargaining power is determined
by relative after-tax income to capture the tax reform effect on female bargaining power.
4.3 Model
This section presents a static intra-household decision problem under different tax schemes.
I first show the model framework in this section, then in the next sections illustrate both
qualitatively and quantitatively how the direct and indirect effects play a role in female
labor supply.
4.3.1 Economic environment
Consider an economy populated by heterogeneous agents indexed by gender g ∈ {f,m}.
They differ by their marital status, with superscript S and M denoting single and married
respectively, and their productivity zf and zm. The productivity levels are drawn from
distributions zf ∈ Zf and zm ∈ Zm. The productivity is measured by educational
attainment, so an agent could be male or female, single or married, and non-college
educated or college educated. Agents are endowed with one unit of time and divide the
time between working hours (n) and leisure (`).
Women and men differ in two aspects. While men earn the labor income at the wage
rate of w, there is a gender wage gap of φ for women, so the marginal return to labor
is lower for women. In addition, following Knowles (2013), I assume that women and
men could have different attitudes toward leisure and therefore have different disutility of
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labor. The two exogenous parameters determine the different time allocation patterns
between women and men.
4.3.2 Preferences
Agents derive utility from their private consumption (c) and leisure.6 The utility function
is given by a CRRA specification separable over consumption and disutility of labor. For
males, it is given by:
Um(c, n) =
c1−σc
1− σc − γm
n1+σn
1 + σn
,
where γm represents the male’s disutility of labor, and σc and σn are the inverse of the
elasticity of private consumption and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. Similarly, the
utility function of females is written as:
Uf (c, n) =
c1−σc
1− σc − γf
n1+σn
1 + σn
.
Note that the elasticities are assumed to be the same for males and females. The only
difference is the disutility of labor parameter.
4.3.3 Prices
The wage rate is exogenously given by w.7 Thus, male wage rate is given by wm = w and
female wage rate is wf = φw. For simplicity, I assume there is no capital income.8
6For simplicity, I exclude home production time. If home production is included in the model, the model
will provide an upper bound of the estimated effect of the tax reform on female labor supply. As
married females gain a higher bargaining power, they will still reduce their labor supply both at home
and in the market to enjoy more leisure.
7Endogenous price will not have a large impact on the result. The higher married female labor supply
and the lower married male labor mitigate the general equilibrium effect.
8In the CPS data, capital income only accounts for about 10% of total household income, and among
which only the short term capital income is taxed under the income taxation. Since I focus only
on working-age population whose major income is labor income and assume the wage rate to be
exogenous, capital is not a major concern in my analysis.
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4.3.4 Household decision problem
Given the specifications of prices and taxes, the budget constraint of a single household
of gender g can be written as:
c+ T S(Y ) = Y
Y = zgwgn.
Their labor income is used for their private consumption and tax payment, and the tax
is assumed to be a dead weight loss.9
Therefore, the decision problem of a single agent of gender g is:
max
c,n
c1−σc
1− σc − γg
n1+σn
1 + σn
s.t. c+ T S(Y ) = Y
Y = zgwgn.
Married households pool their income for their private consumption and tax payment
with a family as a taxable unit:
cm + cf + TM(Y ) = Y
Y = zmwmnm + zfwfnf .
The decision-making of married households is through a two-stage semi-cooperative
bargaining process. In the first stage, they bargain non-cooperatively over their labor
9If the tax revenue is redistributed to all households through a lump-sum transfer, the results will not
change qualitatively. As will be shown later, wives take advantage of her higher bargaining power
to enjoy more leisure and consume more, and husbands have to work more and consume less. This
additional income effect of the transfer will reduce both male and female labor supply and increase
their consumption, but the magnitude is always larger for females due to the higher female bargaining
power. Therefore, females are further better off, and males are less worse off.
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supply, taking the spouse’s choices as given. In the second stage, they cooperatively
decide on their private consumption, given the optimal labor choices. This assumption
is similar to the framework proposed by Gobbi (2018), where she assumes that two
spouses jointly decide on their labor supply, but their spending on childcare is chosen
non-cooperatively. The idea behind this assumption is that a married individual is
informed of the other spouse’s consumption, for example, through bank statements, but
he/she cannot directly observe the partner’s effective hours of work. The semi-cooperative
bargaining assumption is also supported by many empirical studies. Dependent on the
location and age, households can be efficient or inefficient (Akresh (2005) and Angelucci
and Garlick (2015)). By investigating detailed time allocation and consumption data, Lise
and Yamada (2014) find limited commitment of married households in Japan. Therefore,
I model the bargaining process to be semi-cooperative.
Accordingly, the allocation problem of the husband is given by:
max
nm
Um(cm, nm)
s.t. cm = argmax
cf ,cm
θ(nf , nm; zf , zm)Uf (cf , nf ) + (1− θ(nf , nm; zf , zm))Um(cm, nm) (4.1)
where θ is the bargaining weight attached to females and θ ∈ (0, 1). For the wife, the
maximization problem is:
max
nf
Uf (cf , nf )
s.t. cf = argmax
cf ,cm
θ(nf , nm; zf , zm)Uf (cf , nf ) + (1− θ(nf , nm; zf , zm))Um(cm, nm). (4.2)
In the fixed-weight model, θ is constant. However, as discussed in Section 4.2, there
have been empirical studies suggesting that relative after-tax income matters for intra-
household bargaining. Therefore, in the endogenous bargaining model, the bargaining
weight changes with relative after-tax income. For this reason, I assume the functional
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form of the bargaining weight to be:
θ(zf , zm) = (
wfnfzf (1− TMavg(Yf ))
wmnmzm(1− TMavg(Ym)) + wfnfzf (1− TMavg(Yf ))
)α + κ, (4.3)
where TMavg represents the average tax rate for married individuals. α captures the curvature
of the bargaining function, and κ captures the level effect.10
The idea of setting the bargaining weight to be directly determined by relative after-tax
income comes from recent theoretical literature. Iyigun and Walsh (2007) and Chiappori,
Dias, and Meghir (2015) have incorporated the individual endogenous educational choice
into the bargaining weight function, which further affects intra-household allocations. Since
education is an approximation of the individual income level, I follow their argument to
allow the bargaining weight to be a function of relative after-tax income of the household.
4.3.5 Income taxation
The tax schedule is represented by a tax function taken from Guner, Kaygusuz, and
Ventura (2014). The functional form is given by:
T (Y ) = δ1 + δ2 log(Y/Y¯ ), (4.4)
where Y is the taxable income of the household, and Y¯ is the average household taxable
income in the economy. The higher the taxable income relative to the average household
income, the higher tax burden to the household. δ1 and δ2 are the two parameters
capturing the curvature and the level of the tax schedule.
10Standard bargaining models may not apply in this tax reform problem. The collective model assumes
that the bargaining weight is exogenously determined, which is not the case in my analysis. The Nash
bargaining model usually treats being single as the outside option, but the tax reform considered in
this study does not affect single households, so the outside option remains the same. The use of the
separate spheres bargaining model or the non-cooperative bargaining model is also not suitable in
this scenario. This is because it is impossible to distinguish between the tax liability of the husband
and that of the wife under the joint taxation. Therefore, I cannot separate the budget constraints of
the two spouses from each other in the non-cooperative case.
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The values of δ1 and δ2 are estimated separately for single and married households
based on the 2000 U.S. IRS tax file data. For married households, the pair of parameters
takes the value of (0.085, 0.058) and for single households, it is estimated to be (0.105,
0.034). With this tax function, the average tax rate is given by T (Y ), and the marginal
tax rate is T (Y ) + δ2.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the marginal tax rate and the average tax rate for married
households estimated by the tax function and the average tax rate in the data.11 Given
the average household income, the more the household earns, the higher the tax rates. In
addition, the estimated average tax rate is negative for the lowest income bins, as the
tax function takes tax allowance into consideration. Therefore, this tax function is able
to capture not only the progressivity of the tax system, but also the tax allowance for
married households.
Source: Internal Revenue Service 2000 Public Use Tax File and author’s calculations
Figure 4.1: Average and Marginal Tax Rates for Married Households (Data and
Estimates)
11The tax data are available in the supplementary material in Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2014).
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The tax reform is fully represented by the change of the tax function for married
households. Under the joint taxation, the tax liability for married households is a function
of T (Ym + Yf), and after the tax reform, it changes to T (Ym) + T (Yf). Note that the
coefficients of the tax function are assumed to be unchanged after the tax reform to
capture the same tax allowance for married households.
4.3.6 Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the two-stage semi-cooperative bargaining
problem is defined as follows:
Definition 4.1: For given productivity {zf ,zm}, a set of parameters {σc,σn,α,κ,δ1,δ2},
wage rates {wf ,wm}, tax function TM defined in (4.4), and the bargaining weight function
θ defined in (4.3), the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the two-stage semi-
cooperative game is the profile of strategies {cf ,cm,nf ,nm} that solves the couple’s utility
maximization problem (4.1) and (4.2).
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists and is unique.12
12The two-stage semi-cooperative bargaining problem can be solved backwards. In the cooperative
bargaining stage, the objective function is a weighted sum of strictly concave utility functions.
Therefore, the objective function is also strictly concave. The joint budget constraint gives a strictly
convex, compact, and non-empty set. Therefore, for given labor choices nf and nm, the optimal
consumption bundle always exists and is unique. However, in the non-cooperative stage, it is not
trivial. While the objective functions are strictly concave, it is difficult to show that the budget
constraints are strictly convex, compact, and non-empty sets. The budget constraints are defined by
argmax functions, and more importantly, the concavity/convexity of the bargaining weight function
is undetermined. Therefore, instead of providing a theoretical proof that the equilibrium exists and
is unique, I use a numerical method to illustrate the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
In particular, I solve the two-stage semi-cooperative problem by the grid search method. I vary
the number of grids of labor supply from 1000 up to 50000, and all calculations result in the same
equilibrium outcome, which suggests that the equilibrium exists and is unique.
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4.4 The direct, indirect and total effect: a
qualitative analysis
The focus of this study is how married female labor supply varies after the tax reform.
Before investigating the problem quantitatively, I first provide a qualitative analysis.
The two-stage semi-cooperative bargaining model can be solved by backward induction
in two steps:
• Step 1: Taking the optimal labor choices n∗f and n∗m as given, the married household
solves a cooperative bargaining problem for cf and cm:
max
cf ,cm
θ(n∗f , n∗m)Uf (cf , n∗f ) + (1− θ(n∗f , n∗m))Um(cm, n∗m)
s.t. cm + cf = zmwmn∗m + zfwfn∗f − TM(n∗f , n∗m)
given n∗m, n∗f
First order conditions give:
cm = F (θ(n∗f , n∗m), n∗f , n∗m)
cf = G(θ(n∗f , n∗m), n∗f , n∗m)
• Step 2: Given the optimal consumption functions c∗f and c∗m obtained in Step 1,
each spouse solves his/her problem for labor choices nf and nm, taking the partner’s
labor supply as given:
max
nf
Uf (c∗f , nf )
s.t. c∗f = G(θ(nf , nm), TM(nf , nm), nf , nm)
given n∗m
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and
max
nm
Um(c∗m, nm)
s.t. c∗m = F (θ(nf , nm), TM(nf , nm), nf , nm)
given n∗f
First order conditions give:
∂Uf (cf , nf )
∂cf
[∂cf (θ, T
M , nf , nm)
∂θ
∂θ(nf , nm)
∂nf
+
∂cf (θ, TM , nf , nm)
∂TM
TMmar(nf ) +
∂cf (θ, nf , nm)
∂nf
] + ∂Uf (cf , nf )
∂nf
= 0
∂Um(cm, nm)
∂cm
[∂cm(θ, T
M , nf , nm)
∂θ
∂θ(nf , nm)
∂nm
+
∂cm(θ, TM , nf , nm)
∂TM
TMmar(nm) +
∂cm(θ, nf , nm)
∂nm
] + ∂Um(cm, nm)
∂nm
= 0
where TMmar represents the marginal tax rate for married households.
To intuitively illustrate the additional channels resulting from intra-household bar-
gaining, I simplify the model by the following assumptions: (1) The utility function is a
log utility (σc = 1 and σn = 1), and (2) Agents are homogeneous in their productivity
(zf = zm = 1).13
The literature only focuses on the fixed weight case, where θ is not affected by the
tax reform. They find that the substitution effect dominates the income effect, and
consequently, married female labor supply increases.
However, once the bargaining weight is endogenous as a function of female labor supply,
13In the next section of the quantitative analysis, the assumptions will be relaxed.
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the first order condition becomes:
1
cf
[Yf + Ym − TM(Yf , Ym)]∂θ(nf , nm)
∂nf
+ 1
cf
θ(nf , nm)[wf (1− TMmar(nf ))] = γf
1
nf
Two additional effects influence the first order condition, namely the direct effect and
the indirect effect measured by θ(nf , nm) and ∂θ(nf ,nm)∂nf . To understand the two effects, I
decompose the first order condition equation into two parts. First of all, the direct effect
is the case when relative after-tax income affects the relative bargaining position, but the
household member does not internalize the impact of the labor choice on the bargaining
power, which means ∂θ(nf ,nm)
∂nf
= 0. Correspondingly, the first order condition becomes:
1
cf
θ(nf , nm)[wf (1− TMmar(nf ))] = γf
1
nf
.
In this case, the bargaining weight is a function of female labor supply. Since the
income and substitution effects cancel out with each other under the log utility, cf does
not change. The tax reform reduces the marginal tax rate for females, so TMmar(nf ) falls.
At the same time, it leads to a higher female bargaining power because the lower marginal
tax rate increases her relative after-tax income. Therefore, θ rises, which suggests that
the value of the left-hand side of the first order condition increases. Therefore, her labor
supply increases less than that in the fixed weight case, or even falls. The female benefits
from the tax reform effect on her bargaining power. With the higher bargaining power,
the wife enables herself to enjoy more leisure and work less (than the fixed weight case).
The direct effect setup corresponds to the Household Equilibrium concept proposed by
Basu (2006). He suggests that the bargaining weight is endogenously determined by the
relative income of two spouses, but both parties treat the weight exogenously when they
make their allocation decisions.
Now add the indirect effect term 1
cf
[Yf + Ym − TM (Yf , Ym)]∂θ(nf ,nm)∂nf into the first order
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condition. It is unclear how the indirect effect changes married female labor supply, as
the sign of the second order derivative is undetermined. Either a lower total household
income or the θ(nf , nm) function being concave can lead to a higher female labor supply.
In this case, women have an incentive to work even more to increase her bargaining power.
Otherwise, her labor supply decreases and reinforces the direct effect. It may happen
due to the convexity of the bargaining function, as a small increase in female after-tax
income can be transformed into a large increase in female bargaining power, which enables
females to work even less.
Note that the previous analysis results from strong assumptions on parameters. There-
fore, it only presents qualitatively the two additional effects raised from the endogenous
bargaining problem. However, results suggest that the direct effect reduces female labor
supply, while under certain conditions, the indirect effect stimulates female labor after
the tax reform. Therefore, the total effect is still ambiguous and needs to be quantified to
answer the question how the tax reform would affect married female labor supply if the
bargaining weight is endogenous.
4.5 Calibration
To quantify the tax reform effect on married female labor supply and further decompose
it into the direct and indirect effect, I calibrate the fixed-weight model, the direct-effect
model (where the indirect effect part is ignored) and the endogenous bargaining model to
match the U.S. married household labor supply data in 2003. The microdata sets from
which I extract information are the 2003 American Time Use Survey combined with the
March CPS data (ATUS-CPS). The data targets are married female and married male
working hours. Most parameters are pre-determined from the literature and calculated
from the data. The remaining parameters are calibrated to match the data moments by
the minimum distance estimation method.
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4.5.1 Parameters based on a priori information
Table 4.1: Pre-determined parameter values
Parameters Value Explanation
Elasticities
σc 2 Inverse of consumption elasticity (Hall (1988))
σn 3 Inverse of Frisch elasticity (Chetty et al. (2011))
Prices
w 1 Normalization
φ 0.737 Gender wage gap (CPS 2000)
Tax function
δS1 0.105
Tax function parameters of single and
married households (Guner et al. 2014)
δS2 0.034
δM1 0.085
δM2 0.058
Productivity
z_f, z_m 1 College wage premium (Piketty (2014),Valletta (2017), Autor (2014))1.6
Z_f 0.743 Distribution of female education (2003 CPS)0.257
Z_m 0.711 Distribution of male education (2003 CPS)0.289
Table 4.1 summarizes the parameters exogenously picked from the literature or calculated
from the data. The utility parameters are taken from empirical estimations. Hall (1988)
estimates the intertemporal elasticity of consumption based on different data sets and
finds the inverse of the consumption elasticity σc to be 2. Chetty et al. (2011) provide an
estimate of the Frisch elasticity and estimate it to be 3.14
The wage rate is normalized to be 1. The gender wage gap φ is obtained from the
2000 CPS data. It takes the value of 0.737, which means on average female wage rate is
only 73.7% of male wage rate. As discussed, the parameter values of the tax function are
taken from Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2014), with (δM1 , δM2 ) being (0.085, 0.058) for
14Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2014) take the value of the Frisch elasticity between 2.5 and 5.
Therefore, the higher female labor supply after the tax reform that they estimated is not generated
by a higher Frisch elasticity but more likely by children in the model, which is also the case in Bick
and Fuchs-Schündeln (2017).
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married households, and (δS1 , δS2 ) being (0.105, 0.034) for single households.
Agents are heterogeneous in their productivity. The productivity is measured by the
educational level. Two types of educational levels are considered in the analysis, namely
college education and non-college education. Therefore, the productivity level is measured
by the college wage premium, and the distributions of female and male productivity
correspond to the distributions of their educational attainment. As estimated by Piketty
(2014), Valletta (2017) and Autor (2014), based on different data sets, the U.S. college
wage premium in 2000 ranged from 40% to over 80%. I take the average of 60%, which
coincides with the estimation by Piketty (2014). The college wage premium is assumed to
be identical for women and men. The distributions of educational attainment are obtained
from the 2003 CPS data. Overall, 25.7% of women had a college degree, while 28.9% of
men finished their college education.15
4.5.2 Parameters estimated by the minimum distance
estimation method
There are 4 remaining parameters to be calibrated, 2 are the disutility of labor γf and
γm, and the remaining 2 are the parameters in the bargaining weight function α and κ.
The 4 parameters are selected to match the U.S. married household aged 18 − 65
labor supply data from the 2003 American Time Use Survey combined with the Current
Population Survey (2003 ATUS-CPS). The data targets are: non-college educated married
female average daily working hours, college-educated married female average daily working
hours, non-college educated married male average daily working hours, and college-
educated married male average daily working hours.
In the 2003 ATUS-CPS data set, individuals reported their usual weekly working
hours for their primary job and other income-generating activities. I take the sum of
15I assume a random matching between different educational groups. Therefore, the educational
distribution of married couples is the same as the aggregate distribution.
91
4 Female Bargaining Power and Labor Supply: A Study of Eliminating Joint Taxation
both elements and normalize the value to daily working hours. Zero working hours
are also included in the calculation, but observations of those who are out of the labor
force are excluded. A married individual is defined as a person who is officially married.
Cohabitation is not considered as marriage since the joint taxation only applies to officially
married couples. As a result, wives work less than husbands on average. A non-college
educated husband works 7.7 hours per day, and a college-educated husband works 8.3
hours per day. A non-college educated wife works 6.7 hours per day, and a college-educated
wife works 7.1 hours per day. A more detailed description of the data set can be found in
Appendix 4.B.
Overall, I have 4 parameters to be calibrated, and 4 data targets to match. The
minimum distance estimation method is then applied in the calibration.
Let η be the vector of the 4 parameters to be estimated and gmodel(η) be the vector of
moments generated by the model as a function of parameters. gdata denotes the vector
of the 4 data moments. Then the parameter values are estimated such that the vector
of distances between data moments and model moments is minimized.16 The minimum
distance estimator is defined by:
ηˆ = arg min
η
∑
i
(gdatai − gmodeli (η))2,
Table 4.2: Calibrated parameters
Endogenous-weight Fixed-weight model Parameter
model (and direct-effect model) description
γf 39.352 50.922 Disutility of labor, female
γm 46.427 45.437 Disutility of labor, male
α 0.3888 0.3888 Curvature of bargaining function
κ -0.0096 -0.0096 Level of bargaining function
16I use the absolute deviation instead of the percentage deviation because the data targets are of the
same magnitude.
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Table 4.2 reports the calibrated parameter values of 3 models. Note that the parameters
in the fixed-weight model and the direct-effect model are calibrated to be the same.
The reason is that I set the bargaining weights before the tax reform to be the same in
the two models. By doing so, I am able to make them comparable as two models can
generate the same time allocation before the tax reform. Consequently, there are only two
utility parameters in the fixed-weight model and the direct-effect model to be calibrated.
The data targets are the average married female/male working hours (6.8 and 7.84).
The parameters in the bargaining weight function cannot be jointly calibrated since the
bargaining weight is an exogenous parameter in the fixed-weight and direct-effect model.
However, the two parameter values should take the same values as in the endogenous
bargaining model, since working hours, tax rates, and the bargaining weights before the
tax reform are exactly the same.
The calibration results suggest that females have a lower disutility of labor than
males when the bargaining power is endogenous, but the relationship reverses when the
bargaining weight is exogenous. The reason is that when female bargaining power is
endogenous, her labor supply is determined not only by the disutility of labor, but also
by the bargaining weight function. So females do not need a large disutility of labor
to generate relatively low female labor supply. But in the fixed-weight model, female
labor supply depends on the disutility of labor only, and the parameter value has to be
large enough to match the data. In addition, when comparing models, the increased
labor supply after the tax reform is caused by the bargaining process, but not because
females put a higher weight on leisure in the endogenous bargaining model. The curvature
parameter in the bargaining function is smaller than 1, indicating that female bargaining
power is a concave function of her after-tax income. As discussed earlier in the qualitative
analysis, the indirect effect will lead to a higher married female labor supply after the
tax reform if the function is concave. It will be verified quantitatively in the next section.
The level parameter only plays a minor role in determining female bargaining power.
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Table 4.3 shows the model fit by comparing the model moments with the data moments.
Overall, the model is able to capture the data moments relatively well. In the endogenous-
weight model, I overestimate the working hours of non-college educated husbands and
wives but slightly underestimate that for college-educated groups. In terms of the non-
targeted moments, in the indirect-effect model/fixed-weight model where I only target at
the average married female/male working hours, the non-targeted married female working
hours by type are also well-matched.
Table 4.3: Data and model moments
Statistics Data
Endogenous-weight Fixed-weight
model model
Non-college educated wife’s hours 6.7 6.78 6.71
College educated wife’s hours 7.1 7.05 7.07
Average wife’s hours 6.8 6.8
Non-college educated husband’s hours 7.7 7.80 7.80
College educated husband’s hours 8.2 8.15 7.90
Average husband’s hours 7.84 7.84
4.6 Policy experiment and results
How would the tax reform from joint taxation to individual taxation affect married female
labor supply if the bargaining weight is endogenous? Does the bargaining process matter
for female labor supply decisions? And how would the tax reform change the welfare of the
husband and wife? I answer these questions in this section by comparing three different
models: the fixed-weight model, the direct-effect model, and the endogenous bargaining
model. I use the calibrated parameters to illustrate the effect of the counter-factual tax
reform computationally with these three models.
94
4 Female Bargaining Power and Labor Supply: A Study of Eliminating Joint Taxation
4.6.1 The tax reform
The tax reform is characterized by the change of the tax function for married households.
To be more precise, the tax function under the joint taxation before the tax reform is
given by:
TM(Y ) = δM1 + δM2 log((Yf + Ym)/Y¯ ),
where Y¯ is the married household income.17 So the tax liability of the married household
depends on total household income. After the tax reform, it is defined as:
TM(Yf ) = δM1 + δM2 log(Yf/Y¯ )
TM(Ym) = δM1 + δM2 log(Ym/Y¯ ),
where each of the household members pays his/her own tax. The parameters of the
tax function are assumed to be unchanged to capture the tax allowance for married
households.
Therefore, the budget constraint of married households should be rewritten as:
cm + cf + TM(Ym) + TM(Yf ) = wm(1− `m) + wf (1− `f )
Ym = wm(1− `m)
Yf = wf (1− `f ).
4.6.2 Results
In the policy experiment, only the tax function changes while the other parameters are
fixed at the calibrated values. The main results are reported in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5.
Table 4.4 shows the tax reform effects on married female labor supply, and Table 4.5
illustrates the welfare implications of the tax reform.
17For married households, Y¯ is twice as large as single households.
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Table 4.4: Effects of the tax reform on labor supply
Labor supply before after change (%)
Exogenous weight
male (< col) 7.80 7.59 -2.7%
male (>col) 7.90 7.75 -1.9%
male average 7.84 7.63 -2.6%
female (< col) 6.71 6.97 3.8%
female (>col) 7.07 7.21 2.0%
female average 6.80 7.04 3.5%
Direct effect
male (< col) 7.80 7.73 -0.9%
male (> col) 7.90 7.84 -0.76%
male average 7.83 7.76 -0.86%
female (< col) 6.71 6.76 0.75%
female (> col) 7.07 7.18 0.28%
female average 6.80 6.85 0.74%
Endogenous weight
male (< col) 7.82 7.80 -0.2%
male (> col) 8.15 8.12 -0.4%
male average 7.92 7.89 -0.4%
female (< col) 6.78 6.87 1.3%
female (> col) 7.05 7.09 0.6%
female average 6.85 6.93 1.2%
As shown in Table 4.4, on average the tax reform increases married female labor supply
by 3.5% if the bargaining weight is fixed. However, once the bargaining weight is allowed
to change with female labor supply, the increase of married female labor supply is much
smaller. As shown in the direct-effect model, she only works 0.74% more after the tax
reform, since the additional bargaining power enables the wife to enjoy more leisure. Once
the indirect effect forms part of the first order condition, her labor supply increases by
1.2%. Non-college educated women increase their labor supply more than college-educated
ones in all models. The tax reform effect on married female labor supply is higher than
the estimated outcome of the direct effect, indicating a positive effect on her incentive to
gain a higher bargaining power. However, the increase is not as large as the prediction in
the fixed-weight model. Therefore, it can be concluded that the direct effect dominates
the indirect effect. Consequently, the effect of the tax reform on married female labor
supply dampens if the bargaining weight is endogenous.
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Table 4.5: Effects of the tax reform on welfare
welfare change (%)
Exogenous weight
male (< col) 1.3%
male (> col) 0.9%
male 1.2%
female (< col) -2.5%
female (> col) -1.8%
female average -2.3%
Direct effect
male (< col) -0.7%
male (> col) -0.6%
male average -0.7%
female (< col) 2.1%
female (> col) 0.8%
female average 1.7%
Endogenous weight
male (< col) -0.9%
male (> col) -1.0%
male average -0.9%
female (< col) 5.4%
female (> col) 1.9%
female average 4.5%
Table 4.5 presents the welfare implications due to the tax reform. The change is
measured in consumption equivalent units. In the fixed-weight model, the tax reform
decreases the welfare of married females by 2.3%, while the husband gains 1.2% on average.
Married women are worse off due to lower consumption and less leisure time. As shown in
Table 4.6, both husbands and wives have to reduce their consumption when the weight is
fixed, but wives suffer more. On the contrary, the husband can enjoy more leisure, which
compensates for his consumption loss. However, the welfare implications reverse once the
bargaining weight is endogenous. In the direct-effect model, the wife gains 1.7% while the
husband’s well-being falls by 0.7%. Once the indirect effect plays a role, she gains 4.5%
even with higher labor supply, and the husband suffers from a 0.9% loss in well-being. A
married female benefits from the tax reform due to the improved bargaining position, and
the effect is stronger for non-college educated women than college-educated ones. Table
4.7 illustrates that on average, married female decision power increases by 3.0%. The
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bargaining power of non-college educated women increases by 3.5%, and consequently,
her well-being improves. While her bargaining power does not change in the fixed-weight
model, it increases by 0.8% in the direct-effect model and by 3% in the endogenous
bargaining model. If female bargaining power is fixed, the husband is able to benefit from
her additional income after the tax reform. However, when her bargaining power increases
with her after-tax income, the wife is able to keep a larger share of total household income
for private consumption and work less compared to the fixed-weight case. As illustrated
in Table 4.4 and Table 4.6, when female bargaining power is endogenous, the wife can
enjoy more leisure compared with the fixed-weight scenario, and she is able to consume
more for herself.
Table 4.6: Effects of the tax reform on private consumption
Consumption before after change (%)
Exogenous weight
male (< col) 0.3389 0.3384 -0.15%
male (>col) 0.4651 0.4633 -0.39%
male average 0.3754 0.3746 -0.2%
female (< col) 0.4978 0.4961 -0.34%
female (>col) 0.6031 0.602 -0.51%
female average 0.5248 0.5235 -0.28%
Direct effect
male (< col) 0.3389 0.3375 -0.41%
male (> col) 0.4651 0.4583 -1.4%
male average 0.3754 0.3724 -0.8%
female (< col) 0.4978 0.4995 0.34%
female (> col) 0.6031 0.604 0.15%
female average 0.5248 0.5264 0.3%
Endogenous weight
male (< col) 0.3336 0.3319 -0.51%
male (> col) 0.4701 0.4617 -1.8%
male average 0.373 0.3694 -1%
female (< col) 0.5038 0.5077 0.77%
female (> col) 0.6469 0.6488 0.29%
female average 0.5406 0.544 0.63%
The results of the tax reform suggest that lower-educated women benefit more, so the
tax reform can not only reduce the gender inequality within the household, but also the
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Table 4.7: Effects of the tax reform on the bargaining power
Bargaining weight before after change (%)
Exogenous weight
male (< col) 0.3147 0.3147 0.0%
male (> col) 0.3908 0.3908 0.0%
male average 0.3367 0.3367 0.0%
female (< col) 0.6532 0.6532 0.0%
female (> col) 0.6925 0.6925 0.0%
female average 0.6633 0.6633 0.0%
Direct effect
male (< col) 0.3147 0.2975 -5.5%
male (> col) 0.3908 0.3814 -2.4%
male average 0.3367 0.3183 -4.6%
female (< col) 0.6532 0.6598 1.0%
female (> col) 0.6925 0.6948 0.5%
female average 0.6633 0.6687 0.8%
Endogenous weight
male (< col) 0.3147 0.2912 -7.5%
male (> col) 0.3908 0.3786 -3.1%
male average 0.3367 0.3164 -6.0%
female (< col) 0.6532 0.6759 3.5%
female (> col) 0.6925 0.7056 1.9%
female average 0.6633 0.6835 3.0%
gender inequality across households. More importantly, given the different results of the
fixed-weight model and the endogenous bargaining model, this policy experiment suggests
that intra-household bargaining plays a very important role in analyzing policies that can
affect married males and females differently. Ignoring the bargaining process within the
household, we may miss its impact on allocations.
4.7 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I study the effect of a counter-factual income tax reform from joint
taxation to individual taxation on married female labor supply when female bargaining
power is endogenous. The endogenous bargaining power generates two additional effects,
the direct effect and the indirect effect, which drive female labor supply in opposite
directions. The direct effect reduces female working hours because the wife can enjoy
99
4 Female Bargaining Power and Labor Supply: A Study of Eliminating Joint Taxation
more leisure due to the higher bargaining power. The fact that the wife endogenizes the
impact of her labor supply on her bargaining power generates the indirect effect, such
that the incentive of gaining higher bargaining power encourages her to supply more
labor. While the literature, which typically assumes a fixed bargaining weight, suggests a
large increase in married female labor supply after the tax reform, I show that the effect
dampens if the intra-household bargaining process is endogenous. This result suggests
that the direct effect dominates the indirect effect. So instead of working more to gain a
better bargaining position, the wife prefers to take advantage of her higher bargaining
power and enjoys more leisure. In addition, the tax reform may have different welfare
implications. Married females gain if her bargaining power is endogenous and lose if her
bargaining power is fixed.
Even though this chapter only shows a static version of the bargaining problem, and
the specification of the bargaining weight function could affect the magnitude of the
quantitative results, this study still provides an illustration of how the intra-household
bargaining can affect allocations within the family. More importantly, the key implication
of this study is that intra-household bargaining is essential for the analysis of policies
which may affect husbands and wives differently.
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4.A 2018 U.S. income taxation schedule
Table A1: Taxable income bracket and marginal tax rate
Marginal Tax Rate Single & Separate Filing Married Joint Filing
10% 0-9,525 0-19,050
12% 9,526-38,700 19,051-77,400
22% 38,701-82,500 77,401-165,000
24% 82,501-157,500 165,001-315,000
32% 157,501-200,000 315,001-400,000
35% 200,001-500,000 400,001-600,000
37% >500,001 >600,001
Standard Deduction 12,000 24,000
4.B Data description
The microdata set used in this chapter is the 2003 American Time Use Survey combined
with the Current Population Survey data (ATUS-CPS).18 The combined data set includes
individuals who participated in both surveys during the year. In the data set, the
individual reports his or her age, marital status, highest level of education completed,
employment status, and detailed daily time use data.
18More details can be found at https://www.bls.gov/tus/datafiles_2003.htm.
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I restrict the sample to married individuals aged between 18 and 65. Individuals who
are out of the labor force are excluded from the sample, but those who are temporally not
working are considered. All observations with missing values are excluded. As a result, I
have 12, 612 observations in the sample, with 48.3% of them being male, and 51.7% being
female.
Individuals are divided into two educational groups: non-college educated and college-
educated. The college-educated group includes those who completed their college degree
(associate degree from vocational/occupational college, bachelor’s degree, master’s degree
or higher), and the rest are classified as non-college educated. Overall, 44% of married
individuals in the sample are college educated.
The outcome variable of interest is individual working hours. Following Aguiar and
Hurst (2007), I define the working hours as the sum of time spent on work for pay in the
main job and other jobs and other work-related activities. Other work-related activities
include commuting to work, meals/breaks at work, searching for jobs, and applying for
unemployment benefits. On average, husbands work 7.84 hours per day, while wives work
6.8 hours per day.
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